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vAbstract
This is a report about the fourth workshop from the seminar series of IIASA’s
Economic Transition and Integration Project entitled “The Process of EU Accession:
Preparation by Learning and Exchange”. The workshop was held in Prague on 9-11
November, 2000.
The first section summarizes recent developments in the accession process in the
individual candidate countries. The second is devoted to the establishment of regional
institutions for managing the structural support funds of the EU. The next section deals
with the organization of planning, monitoring and evaluation of EU financed programs as
experienced and perceived in the current members states and the candidate countries. The
fourth section is devoted to the essence and realization of the principles of EU programs,
while the fifth analyzes the macroeconomic effects of past and future such programs.
Section 6 deals with the impact of EU funds on national and regional convergence, while
section 7 with the issue of program selection. Finally, section 8 is devoted to the special
problems of the two heavy weight sectors in EU programs: agriculture, as well as transport
and infrastructure.
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Foreword
In 1996, the Economic Transition and Integration Project (ETI) at IIASA
initiated a seminar series on the accession of the Central and East European countries
(CEECs) to the European Union (EU). The title of this series is “The Process of EU
Accession: Preparation by Learning and Exchange.”
This initiative was a logical one, since in recent years ETI has been active in
research and policy advice on the international economic relations of transition
economies. Moreover, several recent ETI research projects, such as the one on “Output
Decline in Eastern Europe,” “Impediments to Exports in Small Transition Economies,”
and “Catching Up and EU Accession” have had strong implications for the CEECs’
integration into the EU.
EU enlargement is a complex process whose importance for the countries
concerned can hardly be overestimated. This probably justifies the large number of
ongoing academic research projects on the topic. A distinctive feature of ETI’s seminar
series is that it is intended to promote an exchange of views and understanding among
the transition countries aspiring to EU membership. IIASA, with its diverse composition
of members from both parts of Europe (among other countries), including older and
newer members of the EU, as well as the Central and East European (CEE) candidates
for EU membership, is an ideal research institution for realizing this goal.
The organization of the seminar series is supported by an advisory committee
with changing composition, in which the most stable and active members have been
András Inotai (Director, Institute of World Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences,
formerly also Coordinator of the Strategic Task Force for European Integration, Hungary)
and Danuta Hübner (Executive Secretary, UN Economic Commission for Europe,
formerly Head of the Chancellery of the President of the Republic of Poland).
The first meeting in the series was concerned with the “Strength and Advantages of
Eastern Europe: EU’s Net Gains from Accession,” and was held in Laxenburg, Austria, in
December 1996. That workshop was intended to help make the CEE applicant countries
aware of their strengths and weaknesses in the context of EU membership and build up
their self-confidence before negotiations started. The meeting had an interdisciplinary
character; in addition to issues of purely economic importance, problems related to the
environment, foreign policy, and national security were discussed. A summary of the
workshop can be found on the World Wide Web at
http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Publications/Documents/IR-97-019.pdf.
A second meeting was held in Budapest on December 4-6, 1997, on the “The
European Union and the Rest of the World: Complements or Substitutes for Central and
Eastern Europe?” The seminar investigated the impact that accession will have on
applicant countries' relations with the rest of the world, with respect to trade, flows of
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capital and labor, research and technology, environment, administration, and culture. A
crucial issue discussed was whether an increased focus on the EU region, as manifested in
the adoption of the common external tariff and common health and environmental
standards, distribution of structural and cohesion funds, and provision of agricultural
transfers, will enhance only the applicant countries’ relations to EU member-states, or
there will also be effects for their interaction with the rest of the world. The seminar in
Budapest was characterized by substantive presentations, lively debates, and
participation not only from the Visegrád countries, Slovenia and EU members-states,
but also from the Baltic states, Bulgaria, and Croatia. A summary of the workshop can be
found on the World Wide Web in an Interim Report at
http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Publications/Documents/IR-98-020.pdf.
A third seminar was held in Laxenburg on December 5-7, 1998, on “The Time
Pattern of Costs and Benefits of EU Accession.” This workshop analyzed the
emergence of various costs and benefits in a timeline characterized by the following
milestones: the start of the transition, the signing of the Europe Agreements, the start of
accession negotiations, accession to the EU, and accession to the euro-zone. The
discussion focused primarily on the CEEC side and went beyond the strictly economic
factors. Separate session dealt with the lessons from former accessions, the implications
of the need to comply with EU’s environmental standards, the special issues of
agriculture, future adoption of the euro and the results of the relevant computable
general equilibrium model calculations. A summary of the workshop can be found on the
World Wide Web in an Interim Report at:
http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Publications/Documents/IR-99-015.pdf.
The fourth seminar was held in Prague on 9-11 November, 2000 on “EU
Structural Support: Its Macroeconomic and Distributional Effects and Social
Environment”. This report summarizes that seminar.
The underlying idea of the seminar was as follows. While reforms in the
candidate countries have increasingly been geared towards EU accession, the short-term
sacrifices of the present period are rationalized by the promise of future long-term
benefits of the EU accession. On the list of these advantages one invariably finds the
blessing of various kinds of EU transfers before, but particularly after EU membership.
Transfers from the union are perceived as assisting the new members in their adjustment
to the challenges of the single market, providing relaxation of the foreign exchange
constraint of growth, contributing to the broadening of physical and social
infrastructures, alleviating regional and national disparities and thereby assisting the real
convergence process.
While the enthusiasm for the coming transfers is obvious, there seems to be
limited understanding of the mixed blessing of the structural transfers and the
administrative burden the acquisition and management of these transfers will require. It
seems that without the proper institutional background and political framework there is
a danger of distortions and counter-productive effects. Similarly to the effects of any
capital inflows it is not sure that the EU transfers will be beneficial for the recipient
countries. In addition, theoretically, it is not clear yet that even with the most proper
institutional and political framework the transfers would lead to the expected regional
and national convergence and cohesion in the union, which is the ultimate aim of these
transfers.
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The workshop intended to enlighten specific features of the EU transfers,
particularly as they appear for the less developed and new members of the European
Union.
The mix of participants at the seminar at Prague turned out beneficial both for
distributing useful information (including results of scholarly research) and for
discussing critical issues of the EU support system. Researchers and government experts
gathered from nine candidate countries (all but Slovenia), several EU member countries
(among them from those that joined the latest to the union, i.e. Austria, Finland and
Sweden), and the European Commission. A relatively large number of government
officials were present from various candidate countries, who at the closing session
strongly endorsed the usefulness of such seminars, in general, and of this meeting in
Prague, in particular.
Accidentally, the IIASA meeting in Prague turned out to be also a special event,
because it coincided with the confirmation of the return of the Czech Republic to IIASA
as a full member starting January 2001.
The Institute of International Relations affiliated with the Czech Ministry of
Foreign Affairs provided a nice, familiar and efficient venue for the meeting for which
IIASA is indebted to that institute. The efforts of Karel Zeman and the Association for
the Study of International Relations, Prague, as well as Petra Polaskova of the Institute
of International Relations were invaluable for the initiation and organization of the
meeting for which we are grateful.
This report is structured as follows. The first section summarizes the most recent
developments in the accession process in the individual candidate countries. The second is
devoted to the establishment of regional institutions as an alleged prerequisite for
managing the structural support funds of the EU. The next section deals with the
organization of planning, monitoring and evaluation of EU financed programs as
experienced and perceived in the current members states and the candidate countries. The
fourth section is devoted to the essence and realization of the principles of EU programs,
while the fifth analyzes the macroeconomic effects of past and future such programs.
Section 6 deals with the impact of EU funds on national and regional convergence, while
section 7 deals with the issue of program selection. Finally, section 8 is devoted to the
special problems of the two heavy weight sectors in EU programs: agriculture, as well as
transport and infrastructure.
The report is based on presentations and discussions that were taped at the
workshop, on papers prepared for the meeting, and on background material and related
papers that the participants brought with them to the workshop. The speakers at the
meeting had no opportunity to check the text of this report, therefore minor
misunderstandings may have occurred for which the responsibility rest with the authors
of the report.
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1. Latest Developments in the Process of Accession – Updates
from Applicant Countries
1.1 Poland1
The European Commission’s latest Regular Reports were released the day before
this meeting, so the presenter naturally reflected her first impressions. Since Poland,
Hungary and the Czech Republic received relatively high grades, this implies that most
of the implementation of the short- and medium term priorities of the national program
for Poland have been assessed positively. There seem to be some inconsistencies in the
document as to the expected date of accession: at one place the document mentions that
the most advanced countries could join as early as 2003, but at other parts of the report
it is indicated that negotiations about the most difficult chapters will start in the first half
of 2002 only. Since negotiation on chapters such as agriculture will take substantial
time, and after concluding the negotiations the ratification of the terms of accession in
the current member states would take at least 18 months, the second information would
imply a date of accession in 2004 or 2005, at the best.
At the time of the workshop 11 out of the 29 chapters under negotiation were
provisionally closed, however, it is clear that these 11 chapters were the easy ones. The
difficult issues for Poland (but also for many other candidates) are agriculture, the free
movement of labor, the free flow of capital (more precisely, sale of land), and the
environment. The importance of the chapter of agriculture for Poland is clear if we take
into account the size of the country, the share of employment in agriculture, as well as
the efficiency lag in agriculture behind advanced countries.
The Polish government declared that by the end of 2002 the country would be
ready for accession: Polish law will be adjusted to the requirements of EU, except for
those areas where Poland will receive transitional periods. Simultaneously with the
adoption of laws also the enforcement of these should develop, as it became also an
important element of the assessment of the applicant countries. Poland has been asking
for a long time for a clear calendar of the negotiations, including the possible closing
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2date of these. The reason for this has been that Poland wants "to be prepared just in
time, not just in case". This is important in order to minimize the costs incurring after
some obligations have been assumed, and thus make the adjustment easier.
Another important issue is the question where does Poland stand in terms of the
implementation of the association process?  In the European Agreement between the EU
and Poland the association process consists of two phases, each being five years long.
The first such period started February 1994 and already elapsed. Unfortunately, Poland
could not move yet to the second stage, due to Poland’s own fault: not all domestic laws
covered by the European Agreement are yet in conformity with the European law. Here
particularly the laws should be mentioned where "national treatment" has not been yet
guaranteed to all EU nationals and companies. An example is gambling: according to
the Polish law capital invested into gambling in Poland can be only of Polish origin.
Since revenues from gambling are high, the Polish Parliament hesitates to give up the
revenues collected by the Polish budget or those ones at least being used within Poland.
Unlike Poland, Hungary, for instance, already moved to the second stage of the
association process.
The reason of improved assessment of Poland by the Commission could be
attributed to two developments. First, in the middle of 2000, in the Polish Parliament’s
lower chamber a special Extraordinary Commission on European Law was established,
and it speeded up implementing, preparing and adapting new laws. Second, early 2000
the government realized the danger that the next report would be too negative, and
therefore made every effort to avoid this, including speeding up the adjustment of the
legal system.
The fields that are still weak in preparing the institutions for EU membership are
public administration and the judicial system: for instance, processes at court require
very long time to go through. As for the public perception of the EU accession, it is an
optimistic sign that following a sharp deterioration several months ago, public opinion
on accession is again improving.
The current macroeconomic developments in Poland are in general favorable,
but there are some clear challenges for the future, such as the relatively high current
account deficit (amounting to about 7% of the GDP), increasing inflation rate, and
increasing unemployment.
1.2 Estonia2
The presenter listed some favorable and less favorable facts about Estonia’s
macroeconomic development in 2000. As for output, following a 1.1% decline in GDP
in 1999, the growth picked up in 2000 to a forecasted rate of 4.1% (eventually reaching
6.4%). A spectacular expansion of exports (around 32-34%) occurred in the presence of
a relatively low inflation (4.5%-5%). Since the government and the parliament decided
earlier to have a balanced budget, the deficit of 4.7-5.0% in terms of GDP in 1999 was
unusually high, but it was related to the election year. In 2000, however, again, due to
not very positive developments in tax revenues, prospects for a balanced budget looked
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3dim. In the past years Estonia used to have current account deficits beyond 10% of the
GDP, so the expected 6.5-6.8% deficit for 2000 seems moderate. However, its growing
tendency starting from 1999 was a cause for concern, because as income was growing
in the economy, imports picked up, leading to increasing deficits in foreign trade.
Transition is not yet over in Estonia as the critical parts of economic reform also
show it. Here one should mention the particularly low targeted level of taxes. Currently,
government expenditures are at 36% of GDP, but the government’s target is to reduce
this to 33%. Accordingly, the accomplishment of the reform of public administration is
of crucial importance. A special government committee deals with this issue. The
person nominated to lead this committee served earlier as a chairman of the
Privatization Board, which is an indication how important the public administrative
reform is considered now in Estonia. This reform is only at its beginning. Discussions
about principles are very heated, particularly about the relationship between central and
local administrations and the tax bases of the two levels.
Another crucial issue of debate is the new Estonian income tax system that had
been introduced on 1 January 2000. The novelty of the new system is that corporate
incomes, which are reinvested, are not taxable. Estonia’s tax system is uniform across
physical persons and companies: both personal income and corporate income are taxed
by a flat rate of 26%, and from the latter reinvested revenues are exempt from taxes. In
2000 it was a critical question how, following the changes, tax incomes would develop;
but, thanks to the pickup of growth, the tax base is growing faster than forecasted and
the target of 1% budget deficit seems achievable.
The next critical issue is infrastructure, particularly the objective of improving
transport infrastructure, developing energy networks, and creating conditions for the
development of information and communication technology. As for the transport
infrastructure, one should mention its important position. According to some
estimations, close to 20% of Estonia’s GDP is produced by transit trade. The underlying
transport infrastructure in Estonia, like in some other East European countries, is in a
rather bad shape and in need of substantial investments.
As for energy networks, Estonia is relying on oil-shale based power engineering:
about 55% of primary energy and 98% of electricity use in the country is obtained from
oil-shale. Two critical issues have to be tackled. First, the electricity network of Estonia,
like those of the other Baltic states, are linked to the North-Eastern part of Russia. In
order to establish an access to the Nordic countries, substantial investments from the EU
are needed. Second, there are environmental problems due to this type of energy base
(high emission of CO2 and sulphur); thus the North-East part of Estonia (where oil-shale
mining and energy engineering are organized) has become heavily polluted, and the
mitigation of this pollution calls for investments.
At the accession negotiations, Estonia managed to close 14 chapters - the easiest
ones. Estonia asked for transitional periods in the framework of several chapters.
Some requests are closely linked to the achieved low level of income. For
instance, in services, Estonia asked for a transitional period in the amount of deposit
guarantee: the current Estonian level is about one fifteenth of the European requirement.
In the agricultural chapter transitional period until 2006 was requested for restructuring
of the processing industry, for various aspects of veterinarian inspection, and for a long
4list of other issues. In transport, Estonia asks for transitional period for levying taxes on
heavy trucks.
As for taxation, discussions are currently focusing on various issues, including a
transitional period until the end of 2006, for excluding VAT on electricity power
generated by wind and hydro-power. Also transitional period is requested for
harmonizing excise duties on tobacco and mineral oils, the former due to the quite large
black market of tobacco. Another request is to postpone the fulfillment of the minimal
level of fuel stock to 90 days, which Estonia would like to fulfill in 2010 only.  The
discussion is about the possibility that Estonia could account also its oil-shale reserve as
part of the fuel stock.
As for environmental transitional periods, there is a long list of requests (as
mentioned with regard to energy), a characteristic one is the requests to fulfill the
directive on drinking water in 2013 only, because it implies substantial investments.
As for external relations, there are no special Estonian requests, except for two
issues related to free trade agreements. Estonia has such an agreement with the other
two Baltic states, on the one hand, and with Ukraine, on the other. The possibility to
maintain the Baltic free trade agreement in the future depends very much on the EU’s
attitude to the Baltic states in general, but the agreement with Ukraine seems to be
transitional, because according to the current opinion of the EU, this agreement should
be abolished in case of Estonia’s accession to the union.
1.3 Latvia3
Latvia is one of the poorest of the applicant countries: together with Bulgaria
and Rumania it stands at the bottom of the list of the candidate countries with per capita
levels of GDP 20% of the EU average at purchasing power parity. Visitors of Riga
should be reminded that central Riga is far from being representative of the country.
In 2000, the most important development in the accession process was that
Latvia was allowed to start negotiations starting at the beginning of the year. Many
Latvians, including the presenter, saw no justification for the earlier discrimination
between the candidates. However, fortunately, the EU recognized and corrected the
mistake. It is important that the Commission stated that the date of the accession would
not hinge on the fact which country started the negotiations first. Latvia is eager to catch
up with the negotiations and just like Poland (as mentioned by the Polish presenter)
Latvia is committed to be ready for accession by 1 January 2003.
Negotiations started with eight chapters in February and March, out of which
five were provisionally closed by May. One of the three not closed chapters was on the
EU’s external economic relations, where the sticking point was the Baltic Free Trade
Agreement. According to the information going around this subject, Estonia declared
that if the three states join the union in different times, they would scrap the agreement
without asking for any transition period. Originally, Lithuania and Latvia wanted to ask
for transitory periods, but later Lithuania pulled out, so for Latvia there is no partner for
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5asking transitory period in this free trade agreement. Accordingly, this chapter will also
be closed soon.
In October 2000 negotiations started on another set of eight chapters. There do
not seem to be any heavy problems with them. The Commission criticizes certain
aspects of the Latvian land regulations; in the economic and monetary union chapter the
Commission does not like that the Latvian government forces some of its financial
institutions to accept some of its own securities. The Commission wants more
independence for the central bank of Latvia. This is a curious objection since the
constitution of the Bank of Latvia was set up essentially on the constitution of the
Bundesbank, one of the most independent central banks in the world. In fact, the
Commission does not like that the minister of finance sits on the board of the central
bank, so he/she can exert some influence; therefore that should be scrapped as well. In
2001 twelve chapters are hoped to be negotiated, including some of the more
contentious ones, such as agriculture. Agriculture is not as problematic as in Poland
(due to its smaller dimension), but it is a problem, particularly getting its shape
consistent with what is required to be in the EU. But implied restructuring will be very
costly, approximately one billion euros, or 15% of Latvian GDP. Obviously this would
spread over several years.
Investments needed to fulfill the environmental requirement also amount to a
very high amount: 23% of the GDP, of which the Latvians are expected to pay 8% of
the GDP. However, this is a longer term process.
Discussion of First Three Country Presentations
A question was addressed to the Polish presenter about the reasons for the
favorable turn in public perception of the EU accession in Poland and about the regional
pattern of public support. The presenter answered that the government’s new
information strategy may have played a decisive role: more meetings were organized to
discuss special reports on accession, more television debates were conducted about
problems of joining the union. In addition, also in the recent presidential election,
responding to the opinions of some of the presidential candidates, the voters had to
make up their mind about the future of Poland and their attitude to accession. As a
workshop participant added, it was favorable that the Polish government’s campaign
targeted various groups of the population in a differentiated way: separate promotion
programs were prepared for peasants, for media people, for teachers, etc. The regional
distribution of public support has not been studied in detail yet; the general impression
is, however, that Warsaw is leading, followed by the Western part of the country.
A question addressed to the Estonian presenter asked about the rationale of
trimming the size of the government (along with the obvious need for increasing
efficiency) just in Estonia, the smallest among the candidate countries. It all happens in
the perspective that the administrative burden of accession and, subsequently,
membership, will place disproportionally high demands on governments of small
countries. Purju answered that the administrative reform has several aspects, including
increasing efficiency, training, more use of consultancy, computerization, and the
reduction of the size of the administration.  The government attempts to show new ways
of administration: some government meetings have been organized on the intranet of the
6government; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reforms its administration in the ’tiger
jump’ way, computerizing almost everything. In this respect the closeness of the
Scandinavian countries is a benefit, since they are leaders, at least in the EU, in
improving administrative efficiency through computerization. While these are
prospective attempts, the presenter agreed that, with accession approaching, the
administrative burden will increase, and according to the latest information, several
Estonian ministries had to face such problems, especially in those very complicated
areas as energy, and in other technical issues. This shows that the policy of cutting
administrative capacities has a high risk. According to his assessment, if the government
managed to keep its administrative expenditures at its current level, that would be a big
achievement.
The Latvian presenter added that high administrative expenditures are criticized
also in the case of Latvia. There is a Soviet legacy here. Although the law “in books”
looks already very well, in many cases it looks even better than in more advanced
western societies, the problem is the failure of implementation, and this originates in the
society. In some sense, implementation was not a problem in the Soviet system. Now
there are no mechanisms of the implementation. In addition, the origin of the legal
system of Central and East European transition countries is in the continental or German
judicial systems, as opposed to the common law style of the Anglo-Saxon countries. In
the latter, if in the common law system the public administration is not doing what it
should do, the citizen can sue the administration by taking it to court. In fact, ministers
in the UK have been taken to court for failing in their expected conduct. But such
mechanisms are missing in transition countries, such as Latvia. For instance, some years
ago a progressive law on higher education was passed in Latvia, but then nothing
happened on this front. What was the solution? The parliament passed a new law about
the implementation of this earlier law.
To a question whether the European Commission can monitor the performance
of the enterprises in the transition countries to evaluate whether they can withstand the
competitive pressures emerging after membership, the Latvian presenter answered a
strong no. He was not sure whether even the national governments really wanted such
monitoring. Moreover, in case even if they themselves could do it, its is a question
whether they would want to initiate such an investigation.
He also mentioned that the administrative culture has horrendous problems of
language and expression. Critical opinions are verbally presented, but never put on
paper, because there is a widespread perception that too original opinions and/or ideas
can be easily turned against those that express them. This might as well be a hindrance
of monitoring, because a part of the monitoring process should inevitably be
summarizing the results of fact-finding in written documents.
In a question a Czech participant from the audience asked whether in the Baltic
states, just like in the Czech Republic, the pattern of regions formed due to the need of
the coming EU membership is artificial, compared to the original historical regional
structure.
The Latvian presenter answered that the territorial reform is both rather
complicated and slow in Latvia. In Latvia from the original 16 regions 6 new regions
will be formed, and there will be some local elections, possibly in 2001. At the more
7general level, if the European Union says that they would like the Latvian government
to do X, the government would do X, or at least, will pass a law that X should be done.
The Estonian presenter added that Estonia has also 16 regions and there are
discussions about merging them to a smaller number (six or nine, or another number).
This is, however, only a formal question: the basic issue is the tax base of the new
regions and the distribution of functions.
The Lithuanian participant added that in his country there are 10 intermediate
units of government at NUTS III level. In its program, the recently elected government
proposes to establish 5 self-government units.
1.4 Bulgaria4
The presenter concentrated on two topics: recent progress in the negotiation
process between the EU and Bulgaria, and the specificities of the Bulgarian economic
development that are relevant for the integration. The first round of negotiations took
place in December 1999, and during the next year Bulgaria presented altogether 19
position papers and closed 4 chapters (these were SME, R&D, education, and common
security policy). New institutions were created (e.g. the Council on European
Integration and the Directorate at the Council of Ministers). In fact, the speed of
implementing the acquis in the Bulgarian legislation was highly appreciated by the
Commission. However, its enforcement was lagging seriously behind. Another serious
problem emphasized by the Commission concerns the policies fighting against the
existing corruption.
In 1997, Bulgaria experienced hyperinflation, banking crisis and exchange rate
instability. The stabilization policies in the next two years were very severe. The output
in the Bulgarian industrial sector declined by more than a quarter during 1997-99; the
present dominance of production depending on low-skill labor is taken more as a barrier
to than a ground for improving the industrial structure with increasing specialization.
The currency board arrangement is judged as too restrictive, resulting in an extremely
low level of loans that hamper further expansion. Mass privatization schemes applied in
Bulgaria were also unsuccessful, hitting adversely the restructuring of enterprises, what
resulted in a low level of FDI up to 1997. The interest of foreign investors revived only
after the financial discipline was reinstalled and the impact of FDI on the economy is
currently judged as positive.
1.5 Romania5
The Progress Report of the EU from November 2000 put Romania to the last
position among the accession countries. It is true that Romania suffered of financial and
social problems throughout the last 10 years. Even the growth during 1994-96 was later
judged as artificial. It was assumed that it had been caused more by changes in the
statistical methodology, than by real events. The permanent instability of the local
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8political system is supposed to be the main factor behind the economic failures and its
elimination will be the key to a future progress in Romania. The aim at gaining political
stability was initiated in 1999 and the provisional economic results for 2000 signal that
Romania may finally break even. At least it was for the first time since 1990 that
Romania was able to stand by its macroeconomic commitments agreed with IMF.
The main problems seem to rest on the microeconomic side. Structural reforms
in the industrial sector have been opposed by local trade unions, and the fragmented
agriculture with hidden unemployment remains a sector that is not prone to a sustained
progress. That is naturally a liability for progressing in EU accession negotiations. In
2000, in the accession negotiations only 6 chapters were opened. Additional 11 chapters
are prepared for 2001 and the concluding date of most of the negotiations is expected in
2004, with discussions about derogations in the most problematic issues pending until
2006. The ratification of accession is thus envisaged for 2007.
1.6 Czech Republic6
The annual evaluation of the European Commission for 1998 and 1999 were
quite critical about the progress made in the Czech Republic towards accession. That led
to a real change in the approach of the government to these issues what was also
reflected in a more favorable report for 2000. The most intensive positive changes
occurred in the “hard core” of harmonization of the acquis. Significant progress was
also reported in the “soft core” of harmonization - in alignments at the level of informal
parts of legal codes, values, state administration, judicial reform and economic
restructuring. The legislative changes received a high priority both in the government
and the parliament, and their intensity was unprecedented since 1993. It is therefore a
credible plan that in 2002 the Czech Republic will be fully in line with the EU acquis
and the remaining requirements of core harmonization will be fulfilled in 2003 – the
year that the government set as a target for the EU entry.
Critical comments can be raised, however, to the real progress in such areas like
the public administration, education, science, and the performance of the judiciary
system. Civil services remain unreformed and the bureaucratic treatment of
entrepreneurial activities at the level of small and medium sized enterprises, in fact,
worsened. The progress in the pension and the social security systems was very slow
and its critical decisions were postponed. Corruption and crime became a very serious
issue pending solution.
Economic growth was boosted by two major factors: the activities of foreign
investment enterprises and the growth in the aggregate demand from the EU. The
restructuring of enterprises is a long way from its completion, especially in large
domestic firms subject to mass privatization schemes. The size of their debts goes
beyond the means of the state budget. The local public perception of EU membership
and the political debates on benefits and costs of the Czech accession show mixed
results. The lack of commitment of some political parties to accession is apparent, and
the population has not been addressed with visions evoking their interest in the
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9European issues. Notwithstanding that, the majority of Czechs remain pro-European,
and the economic exchanges with the EU show the fastest growth and stability from all
the economic indicators.
Discussion of Previous Three Country Presentations
A participant from the audience was of the opinion that the state of the
Romanian and Bulgarian agriculture seems to be a crucial economic and social problem.
He asked what ways there are foreseen for its solution in the near future?
The Bulgarian presenter replied that the agriculture in Bulgaria was pressed by
two main shortcomings: administrative barriers in developing the market for land, and
the lack of financial funding available to farmers. As agriculture does not contribute to
the growth of GDP and the market for land is underdeveloped, the banks are not willing
to provide credits. At this stage the provision of funds from SAPARD resources seems
to be the most plausible way for financing the development in this sector.
The Romanian presenter was of the opinion that the Romanian agriculture faces
primarily a structural problem of employment, since officially 35% of inhabitants were
employed in that sector. The expected growth in the service and the industrial sectors
would change this picture dramatically. The other problem is how to promote the
concentration of land ownership. Programs are being prepared offering financial
instruments, and new laws would open space to agricultural entrepreneurship. However,
in some respects the liberal principles proposed by the government are in conflict with
the functioning of CAP – a matter that must be negotiated with the Commission. The
negotiations were not easy (the Romanian National Rural Development Plan was
rejected twice by the Commission), but the quest for mutual understanding is
continuing.
A workshop participant argued that the experience with FDI in Hungary and the
Czech Republic showed that transformation could be speeded up significantly if the
country were able to attract foreign investors. Can we foresee a similar break-through in
Bulgaria and Romania?
Both the Bulgarian and Romanian presenters agreed that even though both
Bulgaria and Romania have been relatively successful in attracting FDI in the last four
years and both the society and the governments of these countries accepted the
existence of favorable effects of FDI on domestic economies, institutional and
administrative impediments (e.g. on the side of judiciary and institutions) were so
resilient to changes that the position of foreign investors was not satisfactory. The
changes in the institutional and behavioral approaches to foreign investments are
progressing but relatively slowly.
One of the workshop participants commented that the co-operation in the
matters of accession between the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland became a
positive element in the negotiations with the Commission. Can we expect that Bulgaria
and Romania will open themselves to more intensive contacts at the level of CEFTA?
Both presenters confirmed that Bulgaria and Romania have brought their East European
co-operation on the matters of accession to a promising level. Further expansion of
working contacts towards CEFTA is progressing. The problem remains on the level of
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real absorption of foreign experiences on the lower levels in the hierarchy of
administration.
There was a question raised from the public that free movement of labor could
become a threat to the national development if it would imply human capital outflows.
Could the presenters explain how their countries dealt with that problem?
The answer of the three presenter was as follows:  Derogations in the free
movement of labor, due to fears of brain drain, have not been considered a serious
problem in more developed accession countries (e.g. in the Czech Republic). In
Bulgaria, however, there was an emigration of more than 400,000 young people just
after the start of transition, what posed a threat. The destination countries were not in
Europe, but mainly in Canada and the US. Actually the Bulgarian population is rather
immobile and permanent emigration is small. Bulgaria is therefore not afraid of the
brain drain if the barriers to EU labor market would be liberalized. Romania is in a
similar situation, as far as the EU is concerned. The relative decrease in attractiveness of
the American labor market in the future is, however, less clear to envisage.
1.7 Hungary7
What is the current position of Hungary in the preparation for the EU accession
and what is the legacy it brings with itself? It is a general view that Hungary is among
those countries that are best prepared for the EU enlargement, even though we should
admit that no country among the applicants is fully prepared. There are differences in
the level of preparation both among countries and within each of the countries. In
Hungary we can distinguish four levels of “maturity” in EU membership preparation.
The first is economics, the second is the legal adjustments, the third is the quality of
public administration and the fourth is the social adjustments of the process. Regarding
the economic issues, Hungary can be already considered the member of the EU. 76% of
exports are going to the EU, which is the third highest intra-EU share if we consider the
15 EU countries. Only Portugal and the Netherlands have a higher share. If you look at
the structure of Hungarian trade, it is consistent with the EU standards of modern
trading. Two thirds of exports are so called technology intensive goods. If compared
with other candidate countries, this share is 48% in the Czech Republic, 44% in
Slovenia and 30% in Poland.
Hungary is also the only accession country that has a balance of trade surplus
with the EU. All this is based on the privatization pattern of the country and on the
leading role played by foreign direct investment. The latest World Investment Report of
the UN of October 2000 indicated that Hungary belongs among the most trans-
nationalized economies worldwide, together with Singapore and Ireland. The trans-
nationalization index, which is a composite index, quotes that Hungary’s standing is
three times higher than the standing of the second most globalized accession country.
Therefore an enormous structural differentiation has taken place in Hungary in the last
11 years – such that concerns the ownership, intra-industry trade, technology transfers,
financial contacts, etc.
                                                
7
 This section summarizes the presentation by András Inotai.
11
As far as legal harmonization is concerned, the most important point is the
enforcement of the acquis. It is a two-way process: one is proceeding from the
Parliament to the bottom and the other one depends on the social and institutional
acceptance at the roots of the society. In Hungary all these speeded-up due to the early
intensive presence of FDI, what is often omitted in the analysis of impacts of FDI.
Except for technology, management, capital, know-how and trade, FDI has brought to
Hungary also the modern legal system.
The major shortcomings of Hungary can be discovered in some parts of the
public administration, similarly like in many other countries. As to the social acceptance
of the EU membership, public opinion polls reveal that 68% of the population would
like Hungary to become a full member, while the opposition to membership is 8% only.
A surprising finding is that the share of the positive votes has been rising,
notwithstanding the existence of conflicts of interest that became apparent at the later
stages of negotiations.
If we look at the process of EU entry negotiations, all chapters have been
opened, although some of them have been opened formally only. Among those more
questionable we should mention agriculture, regional policies, free movement of labor,
justice and home affairs and also the contribution to the EU budget. Thirteen out of 29
chapters were concluded. The Hungarian official attitude to negotiations is that the
negotiations can be finished, provided there is the political will, by the end of 2001. The
European Commission thinks that the negotiations can be prolonged until the mid of
2002 mainly due to elections in Germany and France, and to some extent also in
Hungary. We can therefore expect that the process of ratification can start in the second
half of 2002, which means that the year of accession can be in 2003. In case the process
will be unexpectedly delayed and the accession will be in 2004, we do not consider it a
catastrophe. What matters is that the EU will stand by the basic rules for accession
which have been reconfirmed several times in the past. First, that each country is
admitted according to its merits, what implies that no country has the right to take any
other country as a hostage. Second, that the process of enlargement is open for all
remaining applicants. This is of the most fundamental interest especially for Hungary
because of its extensive borders with non-EU members at the expected time of EU
membership. Hungary is therefore interested in an uninterrupted strengthening of
cooperation in the region.
To conclude, the Hungarian side expects that the enlargement process will be
smooth, quick and subject to qualitative criteria. Any delay in the enlargement would be
detrimental to Hungary. First, because it will be a threat to the pace of social and
economic modernization of the country, that has proceeded to this moment in a
sustainable way. Second, many of the transnational companies came to Hungary with a
vision that it would become soon a member of the EU with an advantageous location for
the production of service activities. They could reconsider some of their investments
because they based their strategy on the firm EU membership date in 2002. Third, many
scheduled investments, for example into infrastructure, can commence only once
Hungary is a member. These investments have large externalities to all economic agents
in the region, for example to the potential investors - be they domestic or foreign.
Hungary must also maintain momentum in the preparation of public administration and
stick to the schedule of its restructuring. Last but not least, if there is a delay in
enlargement, it causes a social disappointment that can be abused by the politics of
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populism, nationalism, internal conflict and cause international instability in the whole
region.
1.8 Slovakia8
Slovakia has not yet proceeded so far in the integration process as Hungary did,
nevertheless, one must say straight from the start that the situation in Slovakia,
especially if compared with that of a couple of years ago, is in a much better shape and
further progress is in the offing. Slovakia is a young country, having established its
independence in 1993. The internal political strife brought many of the forward-looking
expectations to a halt. In 1997 the European Commission had a relatively negative
opinion about the Slovak accession, mainly because of the nationalist, populist and non-
transparent policies of the government that was not offering a clear pro-Western
orientation. Though the country was not excluded from the EU’s enlargement, it was
neither invited for further negotiations after the Luxembourg summit in December 1997.
The changes to a more international orientation of the country came in autumn 1998
when a coalition of a wide spectrum of political parties was required to change the local
balance of power.
In December 1999 Slovakia was invited to negotiations about the EU accession,
to what the new government responded with an intensive preparation for the
enlargement. In the following three aspects of the standing of Slovakia in the current
negotiations with the European Commission are to be analyzed: legislation, political
stability and economic policies.
The negotiations dealing with the switchover to the acquis have been dynamic
and smooth. In March 2000 Slovakia officially submitted its position documents to 8
chapters. It is expected that at the beginning of 2001 16 chapters will be negotiated, of
which 6 should be concluded.
According to the  presenter’s personal opinion the political stability in Slovakia
has not yet reached a sufficient level. Though the government of Mr. Dzurinda looks
highly professional, the coalition on which it is based has been subject to cyclical crises.
On top of it, the potential government alternative does not offer much continuity. Some
observers even expect a subsequent reversal of the present strategic policies.
The past macroeconomic situation in Slovakia is an interesting case to observe.
The reservations against the policies of the government of Mr. 	
	
we could observe a long period of relatively high growth. The growth was fuelled
mainly by investment. Unfortunately that is the end of the positive news. We must also
add that this investment was backed by government guarantees and by credits granted
by state banks what created large macroeconomic imbalances. For example, the external
deficit became more than 10% of GDP, if measured on the current account. The second
large imbalance – the loose fiscal policy – was indirectly associated with the current
account. The annual budget deficit was running on over 5% of GDP.
The process of transition was also marked by the absence of structural reforms.
This weakness was particularly apparent as the Slovak real exchange rate was
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appreciating and the exports were losing on competitiveness. Until October 1998 the
real exchange rate gained by approximately 25-30%, if measured by relative unit labor
cost increases. The  new government has put a break on the previous developments by
introducing restrictive policies that remind us to a large extent of the recommendations
outlined by the Washington Consensus. In assessing their outcome we cannot come up
with a simple answer. On one side, the macroeconomic imbalances were to a large
extent eliminated. On the other side, the growth of the economy significantly decreased
and the unemployment rate became one of the highest in Europe. We can call it a
tradeoff of the new Slovak reality. Taken from the point of view of the electorate the
former figures of 6% versus the present 1.5% of growth may be calling for a political
change, what the populists do not miss to use as an argument.
On the other hand we should mention that the export performance has improved
in the last two years and the current account deficit decreased to 5% of GDP.
Nevertheless, the stock of FDI at the end of 1999 was a mere USD 2 billion what
reveals indirectly that the economic and political instability in Slovakia were adversely
correlated with international linkages. The reserves of the National Bank have been
USD 3 billion only, which provides little support to the credibility of local monetary
stability. The fiscal stability improved significantly and the process of restructuring has
been guided by a large wave of privatization in the banking sector. As an outcome of
recent prudent policies, the restructuring of enterprises gained on intensity, what is the
best signal for the future development. Taking the assessment in general terms, Slovakia
has progressed significantly in its convergence to the EU in the last two years.
Nevertheless, its lagging in the progress of economic restructuring and the EU accession
behind such countries like Hungary and Poland remains still apparent.
1.9 Lithuania9
The major accession milestone of Lithuania happened in 1995 when the country
placed its application to the European Commission. The National Programme for the
Adoption of Acquis was launched in 1998 and the negotiations with EU started in 2000.
The Lithuanian government schedules the process of preparations so that it should be
ready for the accession by 2004. The negotiations with the Commission have been
already completed in six chapters. By the end of 2001 all position papers are planned to
be ready. The most problematic chapters are expected to concern such fields as energy,
agriculture and environment. The public support of EU membership, according to recent
public opinion polls, is the lowest among all candidate countries. It is less than 50%,
and 33% of the population are undecided. The large part of discord has been caused by
the negotiations with the Commission about the viability of the Lithuanian nuclear
power program. The issue has escalated recently by the Parliamentary elections when
the issue of nuclear energy became a part of local politics.
The co-ordination of the EU accession program is in the hands of the prime
minister that chairs the Governmental European Integration Commission. In parallel to
that, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is in charge of negotiations with the EU and it also
acts as a national aid coordinator. In addition to these bodies there is a European Affairs
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Committee at the Lithuanian Parliament which is responsible for the passing of new or
transposed legislation compatible with the acquis. In its last progress report the
European Commission has given a very positive assessment of the Lithuanian
preparation, stressing especially the advances in economic transformation. For the first
time it recognized that the local market economy operated reliably. Public interventions
and protectionism were reduced, and the macroeconomic stabilization program was
successful. Privatization has been completed with the exception of one savings bank and
sectors of energy, gas and railways.
There are still problems pending adjustment, particularly concerning the high
current account deficit, high unemployment and low private investments. The
Commission noticed a gap existing between the transposition of laws and their actual
enforcement. Widespread problems with the judiciary system deserve a special attention
and a question of reforms in the state administration was opened in order to improve its
efficiency. It dealt with changes in the schemes of remuneration, training and co-
ordination. What concerns the other sectors, agriculture, fishery, exports and regional
policy stood out among those where more efforts would be needed in order to meet the
obligations of the membership.
Discussion of Previous Three Country Presentations
A participant from Poland asserted the Hungarian experience with multinational
corporations. Poland has received in the last three years a massive inflow of FDI and
this trend is expected to continue. There has been reported a growing pressure of
multinationals on the EU member countries’ governments to speed-up the integration
process in Central and Eastern Europe because of the strategic concerns that
multinationals have there. It seems that the role of foreign investors in post-transition
economies will be more substantial and we should not expect their present response to
be limited to a short-run perspective only.
András Inotai responded to questions by stressing that in no case we should
accept a policy that some country is taken hostage or punished for shortcomings caused
by some other accession country. Of-course, the horizon of something like 12 months
between the signing of the Treaty by various countries can lead to an outcome that their
actual entry to the EU will happen at the same time. However, waiting for a longer
period, let us say 3 through 5 years, cannot be explained as a process of approval
procedures. That would create a dramatic deterioration of the international situation in
Europe.
Another problem is the general policy of enlargement. The Helsinki decisions of
the European Commission, that any country can start negotiations, was very forward-
looking and generous. On the other hand, it caused a decline of public support among
the EU incumbents, for example, in Germany. There are voices of populists claiming
that in the near future the EU can have 25 members what may halt the European
integration. We therefore need a clear schedule of procedures and a set of rules for
enlargement without labeling which country should belong to which group.
What we did not consider until now is that it is not only the European Union
who takes decisions how to tailor the enlargement process, but also the potential
developments in the candidate countries. Here we should be cautious. Ten years ago
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each among the post-Communist countries shared two common values: political
democracy and market economy. Though we started from a common baseline, the
actual individual developments became very differentiated. Now we are subject to a
common effort of homogenization through the accession criteria, especially the acquis.
The same rules and requirements are laid on all applicants. However, it is a question if
the absorption capacity of the acquis is the same throughout all these countries. Once it
comes to the hardcore of negotiations, there will have to be introduced a process of
differentiation responding to specific domestic conditions and different demands for
national derogations. A higher flexibility in accession policy should become a part of
the European Commission’s current negotiation strategy.
As far as the transnational corporations are concerned, they represent most
probably the strongest lobby in favor of enlargement. Their impact on decision-making
is often stronger than that of the best-prepared governments. But they are not uniform:
we should distinguish between three different lobbies they represent. The first lobby is
interested in investment in the region because it improves their global market position.
It represents the lobbying for a quick membership. The second lobby is interested in
trade. But the free trade was already created under the association agreement and its
benefits have been utilized. Therefore these companies are not necessarily interested in
a quick EU enlargement. Those who are exporters to accession countries are interested
in the sustainability of the current trade deficits – a condition that is not so crucially
linked with enlargement. The third lobby is represented by those companies, which can
lose if the CEECs enter the EU as full members. It is because of the harder social,
environmental and safety standards, or because of a loss of their present monopoly
position. We should be aware of these pressures and our governments should learn how
to play with these lobbies.
Responding to a question about the main strategic decisions behind Hungary’s
success Inotai emphasized that we can see various factors that call for a reserved
attitude towards a sustained successful development of Hungary. The present favorable
situation is in the first place a result of economic policies undertaken in recent years.
First, there are those very policies that have been highly criticized by some economists
and politicians: it is the so-called "Bokros package" and the austerity program. Then we
should consider the specific microeconomic conditions and the international orientation
created before 1989. As a third element we should consider the policies taken after
1989. They need not have been an outcome of a specific Hungarian strategy but they
were shaped under an international pressure, be it privatization or FDI policy. For
example, it was so because the country was highly indebted and there was no other way
how to get rid of its burden. What we see today is therefore the spillover effect of
decisions taken long time ago. It is evident that the sustainability of such
multidimensional and gradual processes is not easy to achieve.
We can say in the same logic that the strategy for a successful Hungarian
performance as a future EU member must be prepared today. One could be therefore
dissatisfied with the developments in Hungary in the last years, as some very important
reforms were postponed in the belief that the current favorable developments would be
self-sustaining. It will be unfortunate if the burden of adjustment after the EU accession
would overlap with the additional burden of adjustments to internal policies that we
have now unduly postponed.
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A German participant commented on the issue of the German public support of
the Eastern enlargement. First it would be good to stress that it was not spread
proportionally around all Germany. The support in the Eastern part of Germany has
been declining faster than in the other parts of the country. His personal impression is
that German authorities have been so intensively associated with the Polish accession
that it is hardly imaginable that Germany would give a consent to the first round of
enlargements if Poland is not included.
In response to a question about the backwardness and lack of competitive
potential of the Baltic countries Vitalis Nakrosis pointed out that according to the latest
Lithuanian statistics the GDP per capita accounts to 32% of the EU average. If we
consider also the informal sector, we can raise this figure up to 40%. What matters for
increasing the local competitiveness is the growth and the quality of production. We
should take into account that an important share of Lithuanian GDP is produced in two
key enterprises: the nuclear power plant and the oil refinery. Both are expected to
remain internationally competitive. Their role across industries is so important that the
competitiveness of many other enterprises depends to a large extent just on these two.
Also the expected high intensity of the EU transfers to Lithuania is a factor that will
positively influence the local competitiveness.
One participant mentioned that the Lithuanian accession negotiations seem to
pivot around the nuclear power: its efficiency on the one hand, but also its risks to
safety on the other. It would be interesting to know, however, what precautions were
taken that this program does not lead to a risk of an accession failure.
One of the Czech participants commented on Inotai’s call for a more
differentiated approach to the accession and raised the question of Maastricht criteria.
These should be unanimously and uniformly satisfied once the countries are considered
candidates for the entry into the European Monetary System (EMS) and for the adoption
of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). Here the present macroeconomic outcomes
are still heterogeneous among accession countries and a more differentiated approach to
their evaluation by the European Commission would reflect the fact that there are other
priorities, specific for the particular situation in individual accession countries, than the
criteria applied on more advanced countries in their preparation for the adoption of euro.
The answer to the problem of trade-off between growth and external balance is still
pending solution and many governments are pressed to stabilize their economies by
austerity measures without knowing where is the optimal point of reversing the policies
in order to get the economy back on a growth path.
A participant of the audience addressed Inotai asking for his opinion about the
number of expected waves of enlargement and how the potential hierarchy of
membership could look, once there could be in the EU 25 or even more member
countries. That raises the issue of homogeneity of the member countries, as far as the
intensity of their integration is concerned.
Another participant commented that the present international picture of Hungary
in its approaches to EU accession is generally highly optimistic, what may really be the
case if Hungary is compared with other accession countries. The snag is that in the EU
the test of competence is given in a competition with all other countries, including the
incumbents. To this moment we did not have that empirical test. The enormous social
risks of a failure in adjustments have been already mentioned. We also know that some
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crucial areas, such as agriculture and public administration, are lagging behind the EU
more than the industrial sector does. Their failure occurring simultaneously in more
countries can put the process of further integration and enlargement at stake. Maybe it
would be a prudent strategy if the EU would be enlarged first, as a test case, by one
among the candidate countries only. The selection can be made among the best-
prepared candidates. A more extensive enlargement would follow only after sufficient
experiences with adjustments at such working conditions are acquired.
A workshop participant raised the issue that there are numerous studies about the
benefits of accession. The cost side, however, is often neglected. Were there elaborated
in the various countries analyses of the drawbacks that the enlargement may cause? The
adverse impacts can hit a group of population, industries or firms. What is the balance
between those who gain and those who lose, and what measures have been taken so far
in order to alleviate the situation of the losers?
András Inotai in his final response remarked that the issue of European
integration is a part of wider issues – one of them is security. The security of Europe is
indivisible and currently there are no forces that would have an explicit interest in the
opposite. However, uncertainty can be generated by neglect. For example, if some
fundamental decisions are not taken at the right time.
As to the importance of macroeconomic indicators, András Inotai admitted that
he has been always critical to those approaches for which the macroeconomic figures
were the main playfield of decision-making. These figures are reliable and predictable
for the mature market economies, for example such as Canada or the Netherlands. But
how can we rely on these statistics once the fundamentals of the transformation are not
in place? For example, a 3% rate of unemployment can be the result of a highly
successful transformation, as well as a consequence of a fact that transformation did not
even start and the same can be said about such indicators as the growth heated by
expansionary government spending, inflation checked by administered prices, etc.
Sooner or later the truth is revealed with a consequence that a lot of effort and human
confidence have been wasted in the meantime.
We should support a policy in favor of creating a 10-15 years strategy of the EU
enlargement, with clear schedules and rules, but with no firm dates of accessions. The
speaker set a hypothesis that we could expect that in the next 10-15 years there will be
three accession rounds. One before 2005, the second one 3 to 4 years later and the last
one at the beginning of the next decade. The adoption of such schedule would be a clear
message, not only to the accession candidates or the general public, but also to strategic
investors.
Without a clear long-term vision of the EU we can never get a strong euro. The
vision of Europe is dependent on how the EU will integrate and how the enlargement
will evolve in the next 10-15 years. With a clear message about the deepening and the
widening of the EU, international investors will consider the euro as potential reserve
currency. These processes run in parallel and depend on each other. However, the
tendencies for creating different “categories” of countries within the EU institutions,
such as concentric circles or peripheries of various hierarchies around one pre-defined
core of leadership, do not seem to be a lucky solution. We could imagine, however, the
existence of countries that are natural leaders is various areas of development – for
example, in the security, social, fiscal or monetary policies. That would reflect and
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strengthen the existence of diversity of European countries. In fact, it is the diversity
that can be considered the comparative advantage of Europe and a principle that should
guide its development.
We should realistically expect that the enlargement will proceed in groups and
not by single countries. The first group will be taken as a test, anyhow. These countries
should be therefore very much aware of their responsibility in order to keep the process
open and avoid a backlash precluding further enlargements. As a pessimistic scenario,
we can envisage an enlargement where all parties, both incumbents and new entrants,
would have a feeling of being worse off. That would create a political deadlock in
Europe that would be very difficult to overcome.
What concerns the costs of enlargement, they as the benefits, are not spread
evenly in time. A lot of costs has been expended up to this moment and there will have
to be more of them during the next preparatory stages, while there were much less
benefits to come in the short run. We have got to understand that there are also the costs
of transformation that must be considered a part of the process. However, they would
have to be spent notwithstanding the accession. Similarly, there are many costs of
integration within the EU 15 and only a small part of them can be attributed to the
Eastern enlargement. There are also the costs of global challenges and we should
consider to what extent the risks of enlargement could add to them or whether the
benefits of enlargement can moderate their burden.
Vitalis Nakrosis turned in his response to the question on the Lithuanian nuclear
power plant. According to the recent EU safety standards the Chernobyl-type of reactors
are hazardous and should be closed down. However, the Lithuanian nuclear plant
consists of three units and only  Unit-1 should be closed. Its dismantling, the upgrade of
Unit-2 and the building of Unit-3 will require billions of euros in investments.
Negotiations are being held how the international community (including the EU) and
international capital will finance such a development.
Július Horváth replied to a question concerning the Slovak privatization program
addressing the privatization of the banks. Subject to the changes in time and in
governments during 1992-98, the attitudes to privatization in Slovakia have also
changed dramatically. The former policy of creating “domestic capitalist class” and the
ways how its members were selected, was abandoned and the new government of wide
coalition adopted a strategy that became more recognized internationally. Nevertheless,
the whole change is still in a preliminary stage that commenced with the privatization of
banks. Though consolidating the classified loans is in progress, the solution will take
much longer time and its costs will be also large.
As to the question of trade-offs between growth and macroeconomic stability,
we seldom have information telling us the exact causes of recourses to a cycle,
especially if the cycle is combined with stabilization policies. It is only historical
analysis that could reveal whether the past policies were justified and/or sensitively
used. Horváth would disagree with András Inotai that macroeconomic data for
economies in transition are not generally credible. Though the macroeconomic policy
instruments are far from being perfect, we do not have so far an alternative that would
perform evidently better.
19
2.  The Role of Regionalism in the System of EU Transfers –
Necessity to Create Institutions and Channels for Transfers, or
Establishing and Pursuing New Regional Policies
2.1 EU-Induced Changes in a State-Centrist Regime: Lessons from the
First Program Period of Finland 10
The presenter started distinguishing two concepts of regional policies used in the
Nordic domestic debates: small and large regional policies. Small regional policies (or
regional policies in the narrow sense) refer to measures earmarked for upgrading
designated areas (such as investment grants, tax relief). Large regional policies (or
regional policies in the broad sense) refer to the regional development implications of
the operation of the welfare state. For example, there can be some sectoral policies (for
instance in education or health service), which are implemented according to common
criteria, and that imply income transfers from the richer regions to the less prosperous
ones. It is worth mentioning that the latter income flows have been, as a rule, much
larger than those related to the narrow domestic policies, or those related to the EU’s
structural funds operations.
Turning to the tradition of regional policies in Finland, one must refer to the first
specific regional legislation in the middle of the 1960s. Since then many changes
happened. Program-based domestic regional policies were initiated in the 1980s, i.e.
many years before the EU membership. In fact, the history of regional development
policies is much longer, since they played a major role in the construction and internal
integration of the nation state. This is a relevant point here because the nation building
policies since the early years of independence strengthened the unitary state, which has
been characterized by a strong central administration and strong local administration,
but without much influence in the intermediate level. There are around 450
municipalities in the country, which are not only areas of local democracy, but also bear
main responsibility for the provision of welfare state services.
When Finland applied for the EU membership in 1992, it underwent a very
serious economic crisis, including a 10% decline in output. In fact, with some
exaggerations, at that time Finland could well have been regarded as one of the
transition countries. The resulting "crisis consciousness" has probably contributed to the
subsequent profound changes both in the political system and the economic base. As
regards regional policies and structural funds operations, it is an indisputable fact that
the learning curve has been swift and steep. Nevertheless, a closer look shows that the
state-centrist tradition deriving from the legacy of state building policies and the welfare
state has been relatively resistant to change.
Finnish reforms in the institutions and the practice of regional development
policies can be taken for an example how a national policy regime could be adapted to
the European policy framework. However, it is important to state that the European
requirements, as a rule, are not straightforward in the sense that it would be necessary to
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squeeze the national regime into any strictly designed “European model”. Finland's
example also showed that national governments have a final say in the arrangements,
and the adaptation to EU norms shows a wide variety. For instance, one of the main
principles of EU regional policies is partnership, which has been interpreted in widely
different ways, and in different countries has led to different arrangements.
In the following the presenter described what institutional and procedural
reforms were actually made. In Finland, for some 15 years, the responsibility for
internal regional policies lies with the Ministry of Interior. While the preparation of
legislation, promotion of regional policy in different policy areas, coordination of
regional policy administration, including overseeing municipalities, are among the
responsibilities of this ministry, the actual regional policy measures are implemented by
sectoral ministries, especially the Ministry of Trade and Industry. This division of labor
has not undergone any dramatic upheaval since the EU membership, despite that a
number of reforms have been made for the purposes the EU membership, or in the name
of such purposes.
While programme-based policies were initiated at the end of 1980s, regional
policy measures were not organized in terms of programs until 1994 (one year before
the membership). Both the internal conditions (e.g. the economic crisis) and the external
ones (e.g. the anticipated EU membership) conditioned these to be changed into
programs. In addition, the reform was also supported by the developments in the
theoretical and conceptual bases of regional policies. The theory of endogenous growth
was one of the most important among them. Finland was no latecomer in this field.
The direct impact of the EU membership was most obvious in the institutional
reforms, primarily in the intermediary level. It was in those levels that Finland had been
very weak for about a century. As part of the pragmatically oriented swift preparations
for the membership, a partial solution for the distribution of responsibilities was found
in 1993. 19 regional councils, which are bottom-up organizations of representatives
elected by the municipalities, were established, and they were made responsible for
regional development and planning.  Simultaneously, the state-led top-down provincial
governments lost their coordinating role in the regional planning and their number was
reduced from 11 to 5 a couple of years later. Two strands of spatial polices in Finland -
land use planning and spatial development - were also brought to the intermediate
domain of the regional councils.
These changes took place before membership, and interestingly, the regional
councils were not granted a leading role in the implementation of the structural fund
programs from 1995. In fact, due to the fast preparations and a political decision,
Finland started implementing structural fund operations much earlier than for instance
Sweden. It was even before the referendum on the EU membership took place. Since the
councils were not involved in the structural funds operation, a dual system of
governance emerged in the intermediate level in the mid-1990s.
At the central level nothing changed. So it was with the responsibility of the
Ministry of Interior for administrative tasks, and the sectoral ministries for their
implementation and main national financing.  At the regional level, the state regional
administration was reformed in order to comply better with the new situation. Starting
from 1997, there are 15 Regional Employment and Business Development Centers that
include regional offices of the Ministries of Trade and Industry, Labor, and Agriculture
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and Forestry. One specific feature of the organization of structural funds operations of
Finland is that there is only one program for each EU objective: this feature is naturally
supporting the central level administration of regional policies.
The regional councils, when established, were required to provide an avenue for
democratic regional participation and an integrated approach for spatial development.
However, they were not granted resources and they lacked the proper decision-making
competence. In this dual system, the resources and competence was granted to the
Regional Employment and  Business Development Centers, but they lack the mandate
from the population to decide on either policy guidelines or concrete measures. That
means, that they suffer from a democracy deficit. It is no surprise that it is difficult to
live with this dual model, a model which is very different from those prevailing in other
EU countries, for instance the one used in Denmark.
Nevertheless, this unique model has been accepted by the EU. It is worth to
emphasize that the complexity of this model is clearly a domestic achievement, not
dictated by the EU and, as such, it reflects a long-standing Finnish tradition of being a
small unitary state.
The question arises that why was the role of regional councils kept weak? The
standard argument is that Finland’s regions are small (19 regions for 5 million people)
and they lack the capacity and ability to negotiate directly with the Commission. In
another words, they were not established as appropriate institutions with full powers at
the intermediate level.
In fact, this complex administrative machinery is used for structural funds
operations and remains in place (with relatively small modifications) for the next
programming period of 2000-2006 as well. As far as the community initiatives at lower
levels are concerned, for example such as INTERREG, the councils became important
local and regional actors and their role has been increasing.
The logic of the institutional development in Finland can be summarized as
follows:
In the past five years, when EU’s regional policies were applied in Finland, ECU
1.7 billion was received from the structural funds, and about half of these funds were
directed at regional objectives. Finland experienced “the necessity to create institutions
and channels for transfers” (see the title of this section), and the greatest shortcoming
here was the weakness of the intermediate level of the government. In short, the
problem was how to create regionalism almost from scratch, how to respond to
increasing and legitimate demands for democratic participation in regional
development, and how to apply these in a unitary state, where intermediate regions
(whatever defined) are small in terms of population and other resources, and where
regionalism as a political and cultural phenomenon is not strong?
This problem is not unique, other countries have faced and will face the same
phenomenon in Europe. It reflects the diversity of the European territory, and came up
particularly in the Nordic countries in connection with the Objective 6 funds (applied
for the sparsely inhabited Northern areas of Finland and Sweden) in the years 1995-
1996.
Finally there are some additional concrete experiences from Finland in a
summary:
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EU regional policies required skills at the central, regional and local levels. The
latter seemed to have been able to face this challenge: about 90% of the 450
municipalities have participated in various EU projects, and most regional councils
established information offices or lobbying organizations in Brussels. However, the
guiding principles of the EU policies (innovativeness, additionality and partnership)
tended to favor institutions with stronger resources, and this tendency has undermined
the very target of reducing regional disparities.
Domestic regional policies have decreased in importance and have been
streamlined mainly for the purpose of co-funding structural fund operations. This has
raised criticism and became a controversial issue of the otherwise all-embracing
consensus of the Finnish political life.
The key targets of national development strategy in Finland at the macro-level
are R&D, knowledge, innovation, and information technologies. These initiatives,
however, have no clear regional guidelines. In fact only a few of the biggest city regions
have grown in recent years as a consequence of this national strategy. While Finland has
shown a strong industrial development and a modest progress in learning the rule of the
game in the EU, regional disparities have been growing in recent years.
Finland’s example shows that even a small country may raise new issues to the
EU’s political agenda. The entry of Finland and Sweden implied that the EU had to pay
increased attention to the Baltic Sea region, the Barents Sea region and the Russian
border. Similar new issues are bound to emerge with the Eastern enlargement and will
call for institution building for regional transnational cooperation.
2.2 Experiences from the Swedish Accession – Strengthening Regional
Institutions and Internationalization11
The Swedish case is very similar to the Finnish example, partly because Finland
and Sweden are very similar. The background is that Sweden is one of the oldest
centralized nation states in the world. It has been very stable, its boundaries have been
the same for centuries. The very strong state has a major role in the life of the
population. Sweden might be a world champion both in taxing and homogeneity: there
is very little regional variation in the income levels and the level of social services. As
in Finland, the regions in Sweden are very weak, while communes, that supply most of
the services, are strong. The turbulent 1990s, with their economic crisis, led to a major
rethinking of the system. Part of the rethinking was the turn in Sweden’s relation to the
EU: following 30 years of negative attitude to the European Community the Swedish
government, after a very short discussion, applied for the membership.
The Swedish regional system was not only weak concerning its power, but also
poorly adapted to the EU framework. Many of the Swedish counties have only a
hundred thousand inhabitants, and they are not based on elected assemblies. In fact, in
the past decades the power on the country level has become less and the communes
gained more influence.
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To the question that what change occurred following the EU accession in the
governance system, there is a legitimate answer that no important changes happened
either at the regional or the local levels. But one may answer also that, nevertheless,
quite important changes took place in terms of mobilization of regions,
internationalization and general vitalization of the local and regional levels.
In accordance with the preferred attitude of the Swedish government there has
not been any constitutional change: the powers of communes and counties were
virtually untouched. Some limited changes occurred due to EU legislation, mostly in the
field of procurement, competition and environmental legislation. The state held the
foreign policy in its hands, outside and above the influence of the competence of
regional and local authorities. This setup is based on the logic of the nation-state, with a
clear separation of the country and the EU. In this system the government wants to keep
EU politics outside of the national scene, partly because it has a generally anti-federalist
standpoint, and wants to defend the traditional Swedish system.
However, from the point of view of development of networks, and organization
on the regional level, as well of certain single issues, one finds dramatic changes. The
EU brought in a 4th level of government and it implied new relationships and new
opportunities (particularly in the form of EU funds) for the lower levels.  The
international contacts of the lower levels increased dramatically: in fact, the communal
policies started to occur on a larger, international scene. We saw considerable local and
regional mobilization, mostly on an inter-communal basis. This means that it is now the
communes that drive the creation of regions in Sweden and not the other way round that
used to be the normal procedure. For example, when the state is making all the reforms
all over the country, it is characteristic that the new structures are not well–organized
and they have no formal base. Nevertheless, the communes are quite successful in
creating networks, getting the EU funding for various projects, and launching new
initiatives often within the various EU frameworks, such as the INTERREG.
The Swedish state has also recognized the need to look at the formal structure of
the regional system. What we had at the counties, it was transferred to the EU NUTS III
regions. For making the NUTS II regions, certain counties were put together; but these
are just statistical units. Nevertheless, five regions were selected as test regions with
stronger governments. In two of these (Scania and Western Gotland) there have also
been elections, and regional parliaments, called councils, were formed. The test regions
have got increased authorities in some areas, such as culture, employment and
development policies. The “test” runs for 5 years, after which the results are evaluated
and a general reform will be introduced.
Swedish regions, usually the larger ones, due to the need of closer relations to
the EU regions, have set up their offices in Brussels. Presently there are 9 such
permanent regional offices in Brussels. It is interesting that these offices represent the
stronger part of Sweden and not those regions that normally receive most of the
structural funds.
Cross-border cooperation, particularly in the Southern part of Sweden where the
main partner is Denmark, is an important aspect of strengthening regional institutions.
The new bridge between these two countries is a prime example of such co-operation.
Finally, regional interests have become much more pronounced in national interest
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group organizations. They, just like the government, strive to achieve national
consensus and avoid regional differences.
The presenter ended his account with the following concluding remarks:
In formal terms the direct effect of the accession on local and regional
governments was limited. But the indirect influence was important. This change was
particularly driven by the opening opportunities brought about not only by the
accession, but also by the pressure of the preceding economic crisis where many areas
experienced factory and industry closures. Taken from this point of view, market
opportunities, the need of information available in the union, the opportunity to
influence developments in the EU, and the access to EU funding –  these all played a
role, but also some moral support by other regions in the Union were important.
Studies analyzing Nordic regional relations to the EU point out that there are
two distinct approaches: the East Nordic (Finnish and Swedish) one, where communes
make more and more direct contacts to Brussels and circumvent their governments, and
the Western (Danish and Norwegian) approach which builds more on the process of
forming national priorities on regional policies.
The local levels have undoubtedly been vitalized by the feeling of greater
independence due to the opportunity of questioning national approaches by regions or
communes based on practices established elsewhere in the EU. It is interesting that
these developments have made Sweden a lot more heterogeneous: regions have become
stronger in the Southern part of Sweden, in city areas, in regions with export-oriented
industries, and in border regions.
The Swedish government has a somewhat mixed attitude to these developments:
it encourages regions to attract external funds and to launch faster development, but it
also wants to guard national unity and homogeneity. This naturally leads to tension
about competencies and policies such as the approach to privatization, foreign relations
and future visions, particularly in the test regions. Especially border regions in the south
want a lot of more flexibility within the uniform national system and they strive to
become more integrated with Denmark.
Sweden has a similar problem as Finland, as was mentioned by the previous
presenter. It is a typical problem of many centralized countries: how to form regions in a
country where there are only few natural regions, and where regions with identity are, in
fact, not very functional.
2.3 Structural Policies, EU Transfers and Regionalization in Eastern
Europe12
The presenter had the opportunity to work as a consultant in Bonn for an
INTERREG II/C project of the EU that aimed at elaborating a regional development
strategy for the whole Central and South East European area. Based on his experience in
this field therefore he deals with the whole East European region, rather than just
Hungary. Three topics are to be touched upon: 1) the relationship of regional allocation
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of funds and the absorption capacities of these countries; 2) the interrelationship
between the eligibility rules of the Structural Funds and the specific demarcation of
regions in the accession countries; and 3) (an intentionally provocative question) would
the allocation of Structural Funds survive the year 2006?
Absorption capacity
By now all accession countries have established their system of regional NUTS
units according to the requirements of EUROSTAT. Since GDP per head figures are
below 75% of the EU average in all candidate countries, the most important NUTS level
for them is NUTS 2, since they are eligible for the EU support. In six of the accession
countries the whole of national area represents one NUTS 2 unit (in Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Slovenia, Cyprus and Malta), in the other six countries there are more than
one. It is, however, only Poland, where NUTS 2 units are administrative territorial units
with elected decision-making bodies. In Bulgaria NUTS 2 units host some sort of
central government organization; but in all other countries NUTS 2 units represent
merely a grouping of smaller territorial-administrative units without own administrative
functions; they have been established to meet EU requirements concerning planning,
programming, financing and controlling the implementation of future structural funds.
Based on past experience, the Commission introduced a new condition into the
handling of structural funds, the absorption capacity: it established that the limit of an
efficient absorption of external investment support is 4% of the GDP of the respective
country.
According to the presenter, however, that absorption capacity has at least three
important aspects:
(a) Macroeconomic absorption capacity defined in terms of GDP.
(b) Managerial-administrative absorption capacity, meaning the ability and skill of
central and local authorities to prepare acceptable plans, programs and projects
in due time, to decide on programs and projects, to arrange the coordination
among the principal partners, to cope with the reporting paperwork by the
Commission, and to finance and supervise implementation properly, avoiding
fraud, as far as possible.
(c) Financial absorption capacity which means the ability to co-finance the EU
supported programs and its projects and to collect national budgetary
contributions from several partners interested in the program or the project.
As for the macroeconomic absorption capacity, the question is what measure of
the GDP should be taken into account? Is it the total GDP of the country (as is the usual
interpretation), or can it be interpreted as the GDP of the eligible regions only? In
Hungary, for instance, by the time of accession the Central Region around Budapest
may surpass the eligibility threshold (of 75% of per capita GDP) and the rest of the
country makes up only 57% of Hungary’s GDP. Accordingly, if the EU support is
compared to the GDP of the rest of the country, the same amount of support may easily
surpass the 4% cap. Moreover, if the absorption indicators would be calculated for
single regions, low regional GDP per capita may become a serious constraint to
receiving structural support just in the least developed regions, especially in countries
where regional disparities are high, i.e. in Hungary, Poland and Slovakia.
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As for the managerial-administrative capacities, we have to acknowledge that in
the case of EU’s PHARE support, even when the overwhelming part of transfers would
be managed by central ministry units, the timely utilization and spending of these
relatively small sums may cause serious difficulties. The regional management units,
which are just being established, are much less experienced and have less professional
skills than the central ministry units. For the sake of truth one has to admit that
bureaucratic procedures and procrastinated decision making in the EU aggravate these
difficulties significantly.
The presenter asked whether it is worth to establish all the new regional
structures now when the time of accession is rather far and uncertain. A simple
calculation on ISPA13 funds shows that in the pre-accession phase, in each of Hungary’s
seven NUTS 2 regions, regional development councils and regional development units
would have the opportunity of making decision about one single ISPA project each two
years. Accordingly, it is justified to ask whether these bodies would not be frustrated by
the lack of work before the time of real tasks and challenges will come?
It is clear that the administrative-managerial absorption capacity of the
regionalized support system is more difficult to organize and more competitive than a
system based on national quotas. Regional program documents will be prepared more
slowly and would certainly need more corrections and amendments than a single
national document. The availability of the few consulting firms that will be entrusted
with the preparation of the regional documents will be a bottleneck and thus lead to
further lengthening of the preparation period and limiting the absorption capacity of the
recipients.
The co-financing, that means the matching capacity of the recipients, is not
equal to the overall financing capacity of the country. In addition to the national
financing capacity it largely depends on the willingness of the concrete participants of
the projects to contribute and on the technical and institutional possibilities to pool those
contributions together. The willingness to contribute to projects managed by other
organizations is rather low in the accession countries. Both ministries and governments
are reluctant to transfer budgetary resources – once allocated to them – to other
organizations. Horizontal transfer has been unusual in these countries in contrast to the
usual resource transfer along vertical lines.
In sum: the regionalization of the EU structural policies is an important driving
force for more decentralization and for bringing decisions closer to the citizens.
Nevertheless, at least in the first periods, the cost of decentralization might exceed the
benefits in economic terms, and it might limit the absorption capacity of the accession
countries in several respect.
Eligibility rules and the demarcation of the regions
In the accession countries the regionalization was carried  out mainly in order to
fulfill the requirements of the EU accession. Therefore, it is no wonder that in this
process tactical considerations concerning the regulations of structural funds were taken
into account. Due to traditional development patterns and the most recent structural
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changes, capitals and regions around them have reached the highest development level
in the accession countries. Therefore, they are most likely the regions that surpass the
eligibility threshold of Objective 1 support. In the case of larger countries, two
strategies are used to maximize the eligibility area within the country. First, one can
define the capital city as a separate NUTS 2 region (this method was chosen by the
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria). Second, enlarge the region of the
capital city sufficiently to counterbalance the high development level of the city (this
pattern was followed by Poland). Therefore even the rich parts of the country become
eligible. Interestingly, Hungary has chosen neither of these: the Central Region with
Budapest and the surrounding area is larger than the capital, but still has a too high level
of per capita income to be eligible for Objective 1 support. The unfortunate
consequence of this strange option may be that an area inhabited by 30% of the
population may be excluded from this kind of EU support. Since Hungary has taken
seriously that regionalization is not jut subsidy-shopping, it will lose a lot.
Will the regionalized allocation system of Structural Funds survive the year 2006?
Before 1988, when the regionalized allocation of the Structural Funds was
introduced, structural funds were allocated according to national quotas, and the
regional allocation of these funds within the countries was basically left to the national
governments with the obligation to observe the aims, competition rules, and further
requirements of the European Commission. Regionalization served several aims,
including that the more developed members managed to have a share in the funds for
their own less developed regions.
In recent years more and more critical opinions could be heard concerning the
management and utilization of Structural Funds, in general, and their regionalization, in
particular. The following arguments could be heard:
- From 2007 on the few regions of the more developed countries, which were
eligible for Objective 1 support, will certainly not be eligible for such support, not
even for the so-called “transitional support” granted to those countries which drop-
out from the Objective 1, 2 and 5b categories. This means that the relevant countries
(the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria and Britain) will lose their interest in
regionalization.
- After finishing the full enlargement, altogether 51 new Objective 1 regions will
have accessed to the EU. This means a doubling of the number of such regions, and
it can seriously threaten the administrative capacity of the European Commission.
- The Commission seems to believe that in the time of their accession the new
members will be unable to establish skilled and reliable planning and programming,
implementing, financing and supervising structures at the regional level.
- Regionalization was introduced at a time when the sum of structural funds grew
very dynamically. Even if the minimum requirements of enlargement are to be met,
the allocations to old member states are to be reduced. Reduction of funds and the
number of eligible regions is not a popular and pleasant task, as the example of
Objective 2 regions has showed.
- In recent years a certain tension emerged among national regional policies, EU
regional policy and EU competition policy. Eligible areas for national regional
policies turned out to be not identical, but usually larger than areas eligible for the
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EU support. The General Directorate of Competition Policy enforced a substantial
reduction of the upper limit of the national support and also the extent of the
regions that could be supported by the national governments. One of the
consequences of this tension can be that in the next budgetary period, as a revenge,
national regional policies will “integrate” EU support, rather than the other way
round. This means a return to some form of the former national quota system.
- The example of the EU agricultural policy might signalize a policy direction that
treats the new member countries differently, i.e. a policy that invents a new support
scheme for the new members which is not, or only partly, comparable to the system
applied by the present member states. One form of this differentiation would be
retaining the regionalized support scheme for the present members and offering
national quotas for the new ones. Another strange proposal that emerged in
unofficial and semi-official documents is that leading regions, not  eligible for
support according to their per capita GDP, would receive the support funds, on the
assumption that the development of these regions is vital for the catching up of the
respective countries.
Plenty of proposals of reform for the structural policies and funds are flowing
around currently, and according to the presenter’s experience about half of these
propose the discarding of the regionalization of structural funds. Keeping this in mind,
the candidate countries should be cautious not to raise expectations too early in their
regions, expectations that could be impossible to fulfill later.
Discussion of Previous Three Presentations
A discussant from the Commission expressed his conviction that there is no
basis whatsoever to apply the 4% absorption capacity limit to the regional level:
according to the conclusions of the Berlin summit it applies to member states. He
sympathizes with the view that the candidate countries should not focus on the
development of the poorest regions only, and thus neglect the regions around the
capitals that are crucial in pulling the countries towards to EU level. According to his
personal view (as distinct from that of the Commission) it was not easily understandable
why the candidate countries so readily accepted the suggestion of the EU to follow the
regional approach to structural funds. In fact, the acquis communitaire is pretty weak to
enforce on the member states the establishment of the NUTS 2 regions.
A discussant from Hungary found that the question addressed in the three
presentations were that to what extent the EU requirements on regional administration
and policy, so far as they exist, affect the national systems of public administration. On
the one hand, the two Nordic presentations stated that there was not much coming from
the Commission in terms of requirements, and Finland and Sweden did not have to
adapt to a common system too much. The presentation from Hungary (by I. Illés), on
the other hand, suggested that we are running after a mirage of the so-called European
regionalized territorial development, which might not exist, and might not even be
justifiable on an objective criteria. The discussant acknowledged that in many
Hungarian regions its is believed that regions were set up merely for subsidy shopping.
But he was sure that policy makers in the central government do not think like that and
they have a longer term vision: there is a strong belief in stronger regional autonomy
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and decentralization of the state. It is a problem that there is no public debate, the
visions are discussed inside the executive organs. The real problem is how to channel
funds of billions of euros to the right place in a democratic manner. In other words:
what changes are  necessary to put through in the institutional system to be eligible for
the structural funds, because simply establishing NUTS 2 administrative levels is clearly
not one of these.
Anderberg answered to the question what regional policies can really do: he
accepted that regional policies can reduce income disparities, however, they can not
able to cure the illness. Just like now in the transition countries, also in Sweden there is
a hot debate about the effects of regional policies on the capital area.
Eskelinen commented on the question whether the system of regionalized
structural fund allocation will survive 2006. One of the options is that more prosperous
countries will lose the support from the EU. Another possibility is that the structural
fund support will focus on various cooperation efforts, such as INTERREG, or inter-
regional cooperation in general. A document prepared by the national governments and
the Commission on the European Spatial Development Perspective outlines a potential
for funding spatial and regional development. This scheme assumes money also for the
more prosperous regions.
In his comment Illés emphasized that the present member countries had already
some regions before policies for regional development support from the EU were
developed, and therefore they did not have to make much about it later. In the accession
countries, however, partly under the EU pressure, regions are being formed just for the
management of structural support in the future. Perhaps there is a political aim behind
this endeavor on the side of the EU assuming that this regionalization and
decentralization is necessary for further democratization in these societies. In a recent
discussion with a senior Hungarian official responsible for regionalization in one of the
ministries, it was mentioned that for years the representatives of the Commission liked
to reiterate the same guideline: decentralize, decentralize, and decentralize! In 2000,
however, in a moment when the accession is coming closer and the utilization of the
funds becomes necessary, they switched to a suggestion: centralize, centralize,
centralize! The question arises then that what had been the logic behind encouraging the
decentralization campaigns in the previous years?
A British participant recalled that the UK has been a highly centralized West
European member country struggling with the concept that it had to create regions. It
was also partly in response to certain internal nationalistic pressures from countries like
Scotland and Wales. The EU structural funding system in fact assumes a  regional set
up, but the problem is that how to develop regions when there is neither clear economic
perspective, nor regional political perspective to doing it. If there is only an insufficient
bit of either of these identities, then we are left with a mess, rather than with a clear
regional system. In the past the EU had probably used regions in order to weaken
national governments, and that might be in fact a good thing at that moment. But the
problem remains how to create a region which has neither a clear political-cultural
identity, nor a clear economic identity. In Britain Regional Development Agencies were
created with a business function, but in the case of some  regions with no functional
identity those business functions could not operate. And lastly, the problem of
monitoring arises. The discussant’s recent involvement in a project looking at the new
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INTERREG 3-I had the impression that the only thing that one can monitor in such
regional projects is the number of documents that have been produced. This may be
important, but it does not necessarily reflect what you want to achieve with the regional
projects.
Several discussants acknowledged that the message of the Nordic presentations
was that it is better to utilize natural, historically developed regions for the allocation of
structural funds, than artificially create new regions. One participants added that
running ahead with the creation of a new regional administrative system may turn out
not only unproductive (if eventually structural funds will be allocated across nations),
but also costly. In Hungary there are already regional councils and related regional
agencies and they are already working on regional development programs. The danger
is that there will be programs and projects elaborated which are very EU-conformed, but
perhaps not really necessary for the regions themselves. Since many of the regions have
no funds, the implementation of the required co-financing will imply much tension.
Eskelinen commented that apart from the EU related purposes there could be
further motives for increased regionalization and local involvement of people in various
development efforts, in support of local dynamics. If one asks which regions are
relevant for these additional purposes, the answer is probably that quite different regions
in the various European countries, due to different spatial structures, networks, identity
of regions, etc. This has much more to do with path dependency and historical
processes, and less or nothing with NUTS 2 level regions.
2.4 Building the Institutional Framework of EU Structural Funds in the
Czech Republic within the Context of Decentralization of Public
Administration14
The Constitution of the Czech Republic (CR), which came into force on
January 1, 1993, envisages dividing the state territory into an unspecified number of
regions or counties. These regions should play the role of the intermediate level of
public administration, as well as represent a part of the system of self-government in the
CR.
During the first five years of independent existence of the country there was no
sufficient political will to fulfill some parts of the Constitution. Not only that the
intermediate level of administration was not developed, but the establishment of the
upper chamber of the Parliament (Senát) was also delayed for 5 years, and the
introduction of an act about referenda has not been fulfilled yet. In all these cases the
Parliament initiatives were blocked by the aversion of the former strongest coalition
party – the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) –   to those themes. Their politicians
considered these changes only as a pure and unnecessary expansion of the public sector.
Finally, the Constitutional Act on the Formation of the Regions was adopted by the
Parliament in December 1997. However, the coming into force of this act was delayed
by two years (i.e. self governing regions were not to be introduced before January 1,
2000). Regardless of this delay, the subsequent Czech governments have not been able
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to fulfill the constitutional act about the formation of the regions yet, mostly due to fact
that the fulfillment of this act requires about 14 concomitant acts to be adopted.
The historical first elections in the regional Assemblies in the CR were to take
place on 12 November 2000 (just some days after the workshop). It was to happen in
each region except Prague, where the regional Assembly is identical with the already
existing representation of the city. Subsequently, the higher territorial units, their
assemblies and offices are to be set up on January 1, 2001. The progress of
regionalization of the CR was already acknowledged in the 2000 November report of
the Commission.
According to the Constitutional Act on the Formation of the Regions the whole
territory of the CR was divided into 14 self-governing regions. This division is based
mostly on the existence of significant urban centers and their links to their surrounding
peripheries. The final pattern of regions is a result of compromises of various particular
interests. Especially the city centers were able to push through their interest. Also
historical traditions played some role.
The size of the counties varies significantly according to their area and
population. According to population the biggest region has about 1.3 million inhabitants
(and the second biggest – the capital city of Prague 1.2 million), the smallest one has
only 305 thousand. The average size of the regions is 736 thousand people.
For the regional policy reasons the most important levels of the European system
of regions is NUTS-2 (this level is decisive for Objective 1 of EU’s structural policy)
and to a certain extent NUTS-3 (for Objective 2). We can expect that the whole territory
of the CR will be eligible for Objective 1. The NUTS-classification is quite important
already in the pre-accession period because of drawing funds from the so-called pre-
accession financial instruments.
The average size of EU NUTS-2 regions in the present member countries is 1.8
million people, more than twice as large as the average size of the Czech higher
territorial units. Due to this difference the counties were unacceptable for the EU
bodies, particularly for Eurostat, and accordingly, the Czech NUTS-2 statistical regions
had to be created by grouping the 14 higher territorial units into eight larger regions.
Out if these there are two special NUTS 2 regions that correspond to counties: these are
the capital city Prague, and Central-Bohemia (see Table 1).
According to the Regional Development Strategies, which have been already
elaborated as a basis for pre-accession funds, the main tasks for the future development
of the various NUTS-2 regions are more or less similar. These are: the stabilization of
existing economic activities, support of small and medium-sized enterprises,
improvement of infrastructure and utilities for tourism. These tasks represent no
principal interference with the existing economic structure in the regions. Exceptions
here are the Ostrava and North-West regions, where  the main tasks are completion of a
radical economic restructuring (especially of mining and heavy industry) and mitigation
of unemployment. The remaining special case is the capital city Prague, where the main
tasks are  improvement of the environment and a comprehensive solution of the
transport problems.
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Table 1: Dividing of the Territory of the Czech Republic into NUTS-2 Regions
Name of Region Associated Counties Population Surface
Area
(in km2)
GDP per
Capita,
% of
Average
of EU-15
Prague
Central-Bohemia
South-West
North-West
North-East
South-East
Central-Moravia
Ostrava region
Capital City Prague
Central-Bohemia
 	 
Karlovarský and Ústecký
Liberecký, Královéhradecký
+Pardubický
Jihlavský and 
 
Olomoucký and Zlínský
Ostravský
1 209 855
1 106 738
1 182 277
1 130 160
1 492 873
1 664 018
1 246 421
1 289 002
   496
11 013
17 618
8 649
12 440
13 992
9 104
5 555
113.9
49.0
60.2
57.0
55.1
58.9
51.1
57.0
Czech Republic 10 321 344 78 867 62.5
Source: Terplan, Prague, 2000.
The 14 higher territorial units were declared to be the NUTS-3 regions in the CR
(compared with EU-average they are relatively big), while the NUTS-4 level represent
the 77 existing administrative districts. It is to be expected that this level will be
changed within the framework of the second stage of public administration reform
(2001 – 2002), when the existing 77 districts are to be replaced by the so-called small
districts (about 170 of them), to be administrated by the so-called entrusted
municipalities. Similarly to all EU-countries, the NUTS-5 level is reserved for the
municipalities. There are more than 6,200 municipalities in the CR at present. This
number is generally considered too high. The gradual voluntary integration of existing
municipalities is therefore considered  desirable for the future.
2.5 Adapting to EU Transfers: the Case of Lithuania15
The message of the Lithuanian experience from adapting the domestic economy
and the public administration to EU requirements for the usage of transfers is very
illustrative. It deals with the general efficiency of public procurement, selection of
competing projects, their co-financing, evaluation of individual stages of
implementation, adjustment of domestic institutions, changes in the hierarchies of
organization, conflict resolution and many other problems of modern public
administration. In 2001 Lithuania competes for EU funding for its projects in the
programs of PHARE (institutional convergence), SEC (social and economic cohesion),
SAPARD (agriculture and rural development) and ISPA (environment and transport).
Expected EU funding (including CAP, structural and cohesion funds) at the time of EU
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enlargement is estimated to reach up to 4% of the Lithuanian GDP (or approximately
1000 million EUR in absolute terms). The problem is that the effective commitments of
the EU depend on the accession country’s ability to compete for funds by developing
the capacities for their successful absorption. This requires a long way of learning,
adjustments and changes in the management of public investments and policies.
At the beginning Lithuania was particularly unsuccessful in attracting financial
support from the EU. For example, it contracted only 19% of the PHARE commitments
for 1998 while on average the accession countries succeeded to receive over 40%. The
problems appeared on all sides of the management of support schemes: bureaucracy,
clash of interest between the domestic side and the EU side, negative distributional
effects related to domestic decision making (e.g. rent seeking, politicized project
selection, corruption), market distortions, displacement of domestic private investments
by public investments, lack of monitoring and periodic evaluation, limits of
competition, rigidity of factor movements and false expectations. The reforms of
institutions and policy procedures were superficial and the old communist
administrative reality was hiding behind the “modernized” institutional façade.
Thus the Lithuanian government stood in the late 1990s before a crucial
decision: either resign from a revamping of its support policies and get in the first year
of EU membership only 30% of the expected structural and cohesion funding, or initiate
the deep changes that are targeted at gaining the full potential funding. What also
mattered for the acceptance of the latter strategy was large expected positive
externalities that the compliance with the EU requirements had on the functioning of the
public expenditure and investment policies. On the other hand, large inflows of the EU
support funds would require greater demands on domestic co-financing (both public and
private) that may divert domestic expenditures from being channeled to their traditional
beneficiaries and cause conflicts of interest. In the meantime, after 1997 the European
Commission also changed its policies to accession countries: from the soft “demand-
driven” provision to a more austere “accession-driven” support, where efficiency and
public returns, judged to a large extent from the EU’s viewpoint, became the decisive
criteria.
The process of adaptation to the EU’s pre-accession financial policies should
commence with a systems analysis and an audit of the mismatch between characteristics
of national public investment procedures and the EU’s objectives and requirements. The
analysis should unveil areas of major tensions (“mismatches”). In Lithuania the list was
divided into major areas of potential conflicts:
• Vaguely defined and non-transparent domestic development policies whose
implementation could not be supported from the EU funds. Here one could find
e.g. intervention schemes that were in conflict with the market operation,
subsidies that had their history in the communist planning, and vested interests
of private businesses embedded in the public spending. Many of these policies
were targeted on welfare objectives while EU funds are aimed at investments
that should reduce development disparities.
• Existing public finance programs that could be (partially) supported from the EU
funds, but whose existing implementation was not compatible with the EU’s
procedures. Such programs were found e.g. in the development of SMEs,
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exports, quality management, business innovation, information technologies,
tourism, R&D, etc.
• Methodological differences in the management of funds, such as representing
the techniques of multi-annual programming, budgetary control, private and
public co-financing, personal accountability, etc.
The intensities of the level of mismatch and the pressures for adaptation were
assessed against six criteria. At the same time each item was assigned to a particular EU
support scheme. The criteria were as follows:
(1) Programming requirements of development plans.
(2) Implementation structures (such as paying and managing authorities) and their
procedures.
(3) Co-financing requirements and their sources.
(4) Institutional requirements and co-ordination (including both central and the
regional co-ordination).
(5) The division of responsibility for public interventions and monitoring of projects
funded by the EU.
(6) Experience in public investment management and the requirements for their
upgrading.
Though the implementation of the above rather technical agenda is important, it
is not a sufficient condition for the efficient management of EU funds measured by both
benefits for the domestic development and fulfilling the EU policy aims. One must also
comply with the “art” of the EU fund raising, the guiding principles of which can be
best explained on the Irish experience:
• The applicant country must address its real needs and build on the real potential
for improvement.
• The development strategy should be open to co-ordination at the communitarian,
national and regional levels that also implies periodical monitoring and effective
control. There should be effective partnership between governments (central and
regional), trade unions and businesses.
• The management of national and EU funds and the policies that they require is
centralized.
• The largest part (36% in the Irish case) of EU investments should be channeled
into human capital development, followed by productive environment
improvements (27%) and infrastructure (25%). Investments into the so called
“sunrise industries” (e.g. the information technologies) should expand
significantly at the expense of subsidies into agriculture. (A comment should be
added that this policy did not weaken the rural sector.)
• Negative distributional effects of EU and government funding and their market
distortions must be strictly controlled. Public financing and interventions are
legitimate only if they provide public goods whose benefits are widely
distributed and transparent. The positive externalities should be accountable and
assessed in the long run. Public finance should not interfere with the functioning
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of the markets. The policies of the government should be aimed at reducing
entry barriers, imperfect information flows and uncertainty. Compliance with
EU public investments must go along with creating entrepreneurial environment
that motivates economic agents to productive activities that are competitive on
international markets. The public administration therefore must not abuse its role
as a co-coordinator and an institution guaranteeing the rules, and should refrain
from expanding its power into areas that belong to private initiatives.
Discussion of Previous Two Presentations
A discussant pointed out that the problems experienced by Lithuania were in
many aspects similar in other countries. It seems very difficult to estimate the future
inflows of EU funds after accession, such as the estimated 1 billion euros of gross EU
transfers to Lithuania (e.g. for 2006). First, we do not know what rules will be applied;
second, we cannot assess the relative competitiveness of bargaining of individual
countries for the funds.
Another discussant emphasized the uncertainties concerning agriculture related
transfers. For Hungary and Poland (the most agriculture intensive countries of the first
group of candidates) the Berlin Summit estimates for future funding do not include
compensation payments, and a discussion about the future role of compensation was
postponed. In the present EU member countries these transfers are huge. Until this
particular issue is solved we cannot have any serious expectations about the future total
transfers from the EU. The estimation of EU subsidies to Lithuania looks justified, even
if the funds received could go above the 4% of the GDP.
A workshop participant commented on the support of the “sunrise industries”.
Such a selection of supported areas by the government implies judgments, or a “long-
term vision” of the government. However, let us ask: are such approaches compatible
with successful economic policies, once comparative advantages depend on much more
complicated determining factors?
A Swedish participant expressed his view that in the Scandinavian countries 15
years ago hardly anyone could be certain about telecommunications becoming their
leading industry. The risks were, however, taken and the combined vision of the private
and the public agents really changed the economic structure of countries like Sweden
and Finland. No country can lose on supporting the human capital development, though
its particular local implementation cannot be commanded exclusively by the
government.
A discussant agreed that the problem of EU institutions dominating the process
of funding provisions was extremely important. The atrophy of a partnership to a one-
way communication can be detrimental to both sides as the experience from the PHARE
programme shows. Therefore it may not be just the lack of internal commitment in
accession countries that makes the institutions and programs inefficient. The arbitrary
and fluctuating priorities of the EU, whose representatives act in a role of principals,
also point out that there may be present other systemic problems to be solved than just
the domestic problems.
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Vitalis Nakrosis replied that he did not associate himself with the pessimistic
view presented by some of the commentators. His experience shows that the dominant
bargaining position of EU directorates (DG) has been generally a result of the inability
of association countries to become qualified opponents. The EU procedures are open for
local maneuvering and they offer the candidate countries a potential for local initiative,
provided these countries are ready for it. The Lithuanian government first decentralized
the EU support schemes to the level of target regions. Only later it was discovered that
this move deteriorated the quality of projects and a central surveillance authority is
needed in order to keep the process of negotiation with centralized EU authorities in
balance.
3. The Sequence of EU Programs: Planning, Monitoring and
Evaluation
3.1 Structural Funds Programming – A Retrospective Assessment 16
This presentation gave an overview of trends in the implementation of the
Structural Funds in the EU over the past decade including a review of the institutional
arrangements  across Member States, and discuss strategy development, program
management and partnership.
The implementation of the Structural Funds is a highly complex process
superimposed onto the individual constitutional and institutional frameworks of
individual Member States.  In each Member State, national authorities, the Commission
and sub-national actors have different degrees of influence, reflecting factors such as the
existence of regional institutions, the allocation of competencies to different levels, the
scale of EU funding and administrative experiences of economic development.  To
further complicate the picture, implementation structures do not stay static but are
affected by new approaches to economic development, shifting national balances of
power and regulatory change. Further, the implementation of the Funds differ even
within countries and this regional level divergence appears to be on the increase. While
these differences make it very difficult to generalize on implementation structures, some
overall comments can be made.
First, it is a feature of virtually all EU Member States that established
government authorities play a dominant role in Structural Fund implementation. This
involves the national governments in most cases, although regional authorities have also
gained an increasing role, including in more unitary countries.  Overall, most Member
States have sought to limit the impact of EU regional policy on their systems of
governance.
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Second, the relationship between national and EU regional policy is very
variable. In some cases, EU regional expenditure has been channeled rigidly through the
already existing funding circuits of regional policy (Germany, Austria), while elsewhere
the implementation systems for the Structural Funds are more distinct (UK, Sweden).
Over time, there is some evidence of convergence – in particular, the administrative
lessons of the Structural Fund implementation are influencing the delivery of national
regional policy.
Third, implementation of the Funds over the past decade has been characterized
by management deficits at every level, especially during the early programming periods.
At regional level, initially it was often anticipated that program management could be
accommodated within government departments or agencies, many of which had no
experience or frame of reference for designing regional strategies or managing multi-
annual programs. At Member State level, many national regional policy officials were
often suspicious and critical of the policy objectives and implementation requirements
of the Structural Funds and, in some cases, showed resistance to these. It usually took 4-
5 years for the respective officials to appreciate the terminology and procedural
requirements of the Funds and introduce appropriate management and monitoring
systems. Institutional inflexibility hindered integrated approaches to implementation
and this is still widely the case. And at Commission level, the management and resource
capabilities of Commission services were inadequate to deal with the administrative
complexity of the Funds, resulting in the familiar litany of complaints – endemic delays,
complicated decision-making processes, bureaucracy, lack of co-operation between
DGs, inconsistent advice, etc. Unfortunately, these problems are not yet wholly behind
us. The management of the Funds has improved greatly – at all levels over the past
decade – but problems still remain.
Within this broad institutional context, the approach to programming has been
highly differentiated. A common feature is that the programming process is one of
incremental learning, with considerable improvements usually resulting as time
progresses. This is clearly illustrated in the regional development strategies.  The early
programs, launched in 1989, were often viewed as mechanisms for simply drawing
down EU funding and exerted virtually no strategic direction over the program.  Single
projects were assessed on a project-by-project basis with little overall strategic
orientation and they were dovetailed to fit pre-existing organizational plans, programs,
strategies or schemes.
Over the past decade, however, the concept of multi-annual programming has
become more firmly embedded and is widely viewed as more conducive to efficient and
effective planning than annual ‘wish lists’. Most of the recent programs provide more
explicit strategic objectives (employment commonly being the main focus) that have
better links to the specific priorities and measures for implementation.  In the best cases,
clear and targeted strategies are rooted in detailed analyses of the local economy,
provide concise mission statements around which organizations can unite and bring a
coherence to practical regional development which was often previously lacking
Compared to the first programming rounds, the more recent strategies cover a
wider range of priorities, with increased attention being given to business development,
R&D, technology transfer and environmental issues.  This is mainly at the expense of
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physical and economic infrastructure projects – although these still play a more
prominent role in the larger Objective 1 programs.
Sectoral or thematic targeting has become more common. Training measures are
now appearing, for example, which are tailored to the requirements of different groups
(e.g. the employed workforce, the unemployed or disadvantaged, or specific sectors and
skills) and business development measures distinguish between the needs of different
types of firm (e.g. new entrepreneurs, craft firms, firms in declining sectors, high
growth enterprises and inward investors).
These examples are drawn from the particularly good programs, but many other
programs do not show this level of sophistication. A key criticism, which has been
leveled at the majority of programs, is the difficulty of integrating the priorities of the
European Regional Development Fund and the European Social Fund within single
strategies. This is largely related to the separate institutional structures for
implementation found in most of the Member States, as well as in the European
Commission.
The ‘horizontal priorities’ of sustainable development and equal opportunities
have been increasingly pushed by the European Commission throughout the 1990s.  The
more explicit incorporation of both these priorities has been evident in more recent
programs, the full horizontal integration of these is, however, still a longer-term goal in
most cases.
At the start of the 1990s, institutional deficits meant that programs were
disjointed in management and administration. The administrative culture of the EU was
very different, and adaptation of national practices was initially slow. Management and
delivery systems have matured significantly since then. Departmental barriers are being
broken down with more integrated relationships, and greater strategic planning has often
drawn otherwise disparate actors together. A key factor is the leadership of the
programs: key individuals are crucial in leading programs with ‘strong, clear-sighted
leadership’ needed for effective strategic management and also partnership.
Partnership is one of the most disputed and difficult principles of the Funds,
basically because it means people from different organizations and institutional cultures,
with different interests, priorities, expectations and ambitions, having to co-operate and
work together in pursuit of shared goals. At the start of the 1990s there was very little
partnership, and it was generally characterized by vertical and horizontal tensions
between institutions and the exclusion of key groups. The process of preparing
development plans and managing programs was dominated by the major partners, often
national government authorities.  As the decade continued the partnership principle has
become more embedded and the preparations for the most recent 2000-2006 programs
have seen the greatest level of partnership participation and consultation yet.
There are several distinct developments in this area: First, the membership of
partnerships is expanding, and regional level representation has significantly increased.
Further, more social partners, voluntary and community groups are becoming involved
– although this is not a universal trend. Second, there is evidence that communication
and coordination between actors at regional level has improved.  Especially in unitary
states, collective regional strategic thinking, planning and co-ordination has been
introduced for the first time or rediscovered. The Funds are promoting better contacts
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between the public and private sectors, economic development organizations, voluntary
organizations and other bodies.
What are the lessons learnt for the future? Drawing all these comments together,
there is clear evidence through the 1990s of an overall improvement in strategic
direction, program management, project delivery and partnership in the Structural Fund
programs.  However, wide differences between programs remain and the dissemination
of good practice, or at least potential practical solutions to common problems, is not
always widespread. The programming requirements of the new 2000-06 period are, if
anything, more demanding and complex and concerns already exist among program
managers about the associated administrative burden.
The fact that effective programming is a learned process, sometimes over a
considerable length of time, emerges very clearly from the experiences with the
Structural Funds during the last decade. The challenge is how to use this expertise in
light of the future accession of Central and East European countries to the EU.
The accession of the candidate countries implies that this will be the last period
of assistance for many of the current Structural Fund regions.  This calls for embedding
structures, systems and initiatives to ensure that they will benefit longer-term efficiency
and effectiveness.  Therefore many of the current Structural Fund programs will be
focusing on supporting projects, or experimenting with instruments, that are self-
sustaining in an attempt to ensure durable economic structures for the future.
The exact framework and regulatory requirements, which will govern future EU
structural and cohesion policy in the current candidate countries, is not yet known.
There have been calls for a fundamental re-think of EU policy in the light of the
economic situation of the candidate countries and the new patterns of regional disparity,
which will result from enlargement.  The outcome is far from clear.  However, a key
lesson of the past ten years of Structural funding in the current Member States is that the
effective and efficient preparation and administration of Structural Fund programs is not
a process that can either instantly or easily be introduced. Rather, the learning curve is
steep and presents different challenges depending on the particular institutional make-up
of each country.
3.2  Structural Funds in Poland – Challenges and Options17
The presenter drew his observations from his hands-on experience from
managing the PHARE Programme funds during the mid 1990s, as he was responsible
for managing more than 200 million EUR passing annually to Poland. Since 2000 the
annual EU funds for Poland increased to 920 million what made it an important item in
the local public finance. The funds will further increase. At the Berlin summit it was
agreed that 3750 million EUR would be allocated to the 10 candidate countries for
spending for 2002. The problem is that at that time, most probably, none of these
countries will be able to use them as EU members. Another problem is with the
absorption capacity and the efficiency of allocation in given countries.
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The pre-accession funding has two priorities that are not compatible: on the one
hand it aims to bring the accession countries to a full membership as fast as possible; on
the other hand, it aims to prepare these countries for a prudent implementation of the
EU structural policies. The problem of co-ordination of these priorities is very difficult
to accomplish. While Poland has been able to introduce successfully the ISPA Fund,
negotiations about the introduction of SAPARD Fund have been at a deadlock. The
main weight of the preparation for the structural funds rested in the meantime on the
PHARE-2 scheme and its three projects – Social and Economic Cohesion, Institution
Building, and Cross-Border Co-operation.
It became a principle in the recent Polish policies that decentralized decision-
making play an important role in fund allocations. The problem is that the EU financial
instruments are allocated to different ministries, so the sectoral and the regional
approaches to management are at conflict. The Polish regional organization was created
with an aim that their regional governments should take responsibilities belonging to
NUTS. Brussels first did not agree that all 16 regions would become automatically the
agents of structural funds. A partial participation was later agreed for some of them with
a potential widening of the scheme in the near future. Thus in 2001 11 regions are
involved in the preparation for the structural and the cohesion support. The problem of
matching funds was solved by amalgamating the domestic resources from central
budgets with those of the regions with the provision that the role of the regions would
grow in the meantime.
Another important agenda deals with assigning a leading managerial role in the
structural funding to only one of the ministries. The Ministry of Economy seems to be
the winning candidate, though the positions of the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry
for Regional Development have been also strong. The danger of politicization and
changing the process of management into an arena of a struggle for power is extremely
large and the governments should avoid it. Another decisions deals with setting a
programming system that would allow for a smooth transition of the pre-accession
conditions to the different post-accession conditions. The strategy of the National
Development Plan has therefore to be adjusted to four structural funds plus to two
priorities of the cohesion funds. The plan was broken down to 16 regional parts,
however, transport infrastructure and environment will be kept at the sectoral level.
The outlined system should become fully operational before 2004 when the EU
accession is expected. That is a demanding task, which will be controlled from three
sides. First, it is the efficiency of the public administration that must be improved.
Second, it is the financial dimension. For example, the matching domestic funds were
upgraded from 25% to 37% (and potentially it can be even more) in order to keep up
with the level of efficiency of cohesion projects; this implies a large domestic fiscal
burden. Third, there is the structural dimension that deals at the level of localities and
industries.
As to the traps of an efficient use of structural funds, one should mention
attempts for re-centralization of regional policies or an excessive concentration on
infrastructural projects. Bureaucratic approaches that fail on programming, monitoring
and evaluation of the efficient absorption of EU funds may result in serious economic
losses that will keep the whole economy at low stages of development, and at the same
time undermine the future success in competing for EU support.
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3.3 Management of Pre-Accession Instruments and Preparations for the
Structural Funds18
The presentation touched not only on the Hungarian experience but also more on
general issues that were relevant for national success in the usage of the EU structural
support. The currently existing pre-accession funds are temporary and soon they will
have to be transformed in the following way: PHARE to ERDF and ESF, ISPA to
Cohesion Fund, and SAPARD to EAGGF/FIFG. The funding will be not only more
than doubled but also the existing procedures in these instruments will have to be
upgraded to more demanding standards valid in the successor schemes. The deadline for
transition is 2006, at the latest. By that time the total EU budget for these instruments
will be 108 billion EUR, with the net increase being nearly completely dedicated to the
new members. Thus in 2006 the incumbents will actually get the same amount as they
did in 2000, notwithstanding their growth. Hungary is expected to get 1.5–3 billion
EUR from the cohesion and structural funds around 2006 when the 4% limit relative to
GDP will be reached. Compared to the present level, Hungary will spend up to 12 times
more, what presents a challenge to the administrative and institutional parts of the
programs.
The question is if the PHARE programme contributed to the ability of the
candidate countries to cope with the structural funds. Here one should be rather critical.
Mind you that the relationship between the association countries and the Commission
has been unequal. On the programming side the donor dominated the agenda. In the
requirements for co-financing the EU had a strong leverage on domestic policies of the
beneficiaries. On the side of implementation PHARE worked on artificial, arbitrary and
inefficient principles that had little common with how the structural policies are used.
For example, the EU was not flexible and enforced the same implementation principles
on all association countries irrespective of their national procedures, getting thus their
initiatives into a sort of straightjacket. On top of it, the enforced principles have been
separated from the policies and financial mechanisms applied both at the EU and at the
national levels. As a result, PHARE could even block the internal domestic
developments that aimed at the priorities of harmonization and cohesion. Thus it created
parallel structures, confusion and bureaucracy. Reports of such institutions like the
OECD pointed out that there exists a prolonged mismanagement in this respect.
Contrary to expectations, the managerial techniques of  the Commission cannot be
compared with  up-to-date approaches of project management. For example, the
techniques of program performance or the project cycle management techniques have
been only currently introduced. Not surprisingly, evidently weak projects were
approved while potentially successful projects were declined.
It should be mentioned that, with approaching the stage of a switchover to
structural funds, improvements are under way what includes decentralization and
integration of programs for sectors and regions. Further changes are required in the
institutional aspects, such as the building of partnership on both the horizontal and
vertical levels of management where autonomy for decision-making is important. The
centralized powers should be redistributed and they should follow the pattern of the
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funding structures. This process will have an impact on the increase in competition that
would require a revamping of the competition rules.
One message is certain: in Hungary the regions showed the will and the ability
to cope with demands for an efficient system of public structural investments. There still
exists a large space for improvements on both sides of the project management, but  the
development policy has been showing recently encouraging results.
Discussion of Previous Three Presentations
A discussant asked about the management structure of funds in Poland. It was
mentioned that Poland had worked out more than 20 operational programs (16 of them
are regional). Does this imply that there were established as many management
authorities? Would it not be better to centralize the programs and have fewer
management institutions? Another question referred to the experience of the East
German accession. If we compare the extent of resources invested into cohesion in East
Germany with the real results, then we cannot do else but have doubts whether the much
more limited EU structural resources could strike a difference and bring results that are
expected.
Jacek Szlachta responded to both questions. For a large country, such as Poland,
the center must rely on both the regional and the local level. The role of the latter is
crucial and in Poland it controls approximately 22% of the budget. The majority of the
projects are co-financed also at the local level. The dispersion of users at the local level
is a disadvantage, thus the regional bodies must co-ordinate their activities and represent
them in the negotiations with the centrally positioned organizations. In Eastern
Germany there was an excessive belief in the ability to manage the allocation of
structural funds from the center, but the results were not satisfactory. We think that in
Central Europe the funds can be allocated more efficiently. If Poland joined EU in 2003,
we expect up to 22 billion euros for EU assistance in four years, plus 8-9 billion from
public national funds and 5-6 billion euros raised from the private sector. Such amounts
cannot be spent on few projects managed from the center. We must therefore expect that
the initiative will come from the regions and the local authorities. The EU authorities
often do not understand this Polish specificity and try to apply on us a model that fits
smaller countries.
Péter Heil responded very critically to some comments. It is an inadmissible
simplification to argue that the problem of funds is a central political issue of accession.
The misunderstanding is on both sides of the negotiating parties. First, for claiming that
funds are crucial for making the accession attractive enough for poorer candidate
countries. Second, for resisting the admittance of new members from transition
countries on grounds that it would be too costly for the incumbents. We must see
beyond the lobbyist bandwagons hidden behind such statements. In fact, we should
argue that the Eastern enlargement does not represent only costs on the EU side. Firstly,
there is a condition agreed in Copenhagen that the transition countries could join only if
they are transformed and the cost of that must be borne in principle by themselves. The
annual cost of EU through PHARE represents in this case a mere 10 EUR per capita!
That is much less than what were the costs of EU for the accession of the four cohesion
countries, estimated to be 400-500 EUR per capita. The cumulated FDI inflows to
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Hungary have been 2000 EUR per capita – this all makes the discussion about the EU
costs of transition less relevant.
Secondly, we should not expect any major shock to occur after accession. For
example, today the share of high-tech sector products in Hungarian exports to Germany
is higher than the same share in Austrian exports. The industrial and financial sectors
are internationally competitive without interventions. The transfer of funds after
accession will not be a crucial condition for the further development in the majority of
accession countries. It is simply the interest of the EU to follow its regional cohesion
policies in order to expand the potential of the single market as a whole and bring
benefits to all EU members. Based on the Ceccini Report, the impact of approximately
100 million new consumers from the accession countries will bring the EU countries as
a whole on a higher growth path. That would imply that for the period of mere 8 years
the benefits of enlargement could finance the whole EU budget and not only the
additional transfers to accession countries. It is also in the interest of the current
candidate countries that the EU transfers are used efficiently because otherwise they
would waste the local funds used for co-financing. Heil emphasized that he believed
that the regional management of the EU financing was both more efficient and more
compatible with democracy than the alternative approaches.
Ruth Downes responded to the discussion with an idea that structural funds are
not a panacea for fostering growth in member countries. The decisions at the national
framework and the national strategy of development play a much more important role
than the structural funds, and the EU funding does not have a potential that could
reverse or significantly improve the internally generated pace of restructuring. The EU
structural funds should be therefore looked at as an additional leverage on speeding-up
the existing development in some of the less fortunate sectors.
The decentralization of management of funds depends on the conditions and
traditions of the country. In federal countries, where the existing regional bodies have
been for a long time used to operate on various public investment programs (e.g. in
Germany or in Austria), the situation is different from the originally centralized
countries where the regional management had to be newly established. For example, in
the Swedish case the implementation of funds was completely regionalized at the
county level. In some unitary countries (Portugal, Spain) there still remains the central
control mainly in Objective 1 programs. In Britain (particularly in Scotland) semi-
private executive bodies were set-up that were entirely responsible for the selection of
projects, discussion with the project applicants and tailoring those to positions required
for a successful financing and implementation of the project.
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4. The Rationale, Importance and Effectiveness of Principles of
EU Programs: Subsidiarity, Additionality, Concentration and
Co-financing
4.1 Some Reflections on Costs and Benefits of EU Programs: The
Austrian Experience since 1995 19
The division of competences between Brussels and the national or regional
authorities has always been a moot point. Why should Brussels know better than
national capitals or regional authorities about their own development needs and
priorities? The EU level depends naturally to a very high degree on member-state
administrations and on the expertise of local private businesses.
The small staff and the internal organization of the Commission do not keep the
with the growing amounts of money and the width of programs, which the Commission
has been asked to administer. The Commission is in fact a small player. The EU budget
amounts to only 1.2% of GDP in EU countries (out of it a half is spent on agriculture),
while public expenditure in the member states amounts to 40-60% of GDP. Therefore
80-85% of the annual EU budget is channeled through member states’ administrations
whose efficiency and cultures differ a lot. Thus the unified legislation and procedural
techniques are being designed for the less perfectly working administrations. This
results in detailed legislations and extensive informative feedbacks in all the member
countries, even in those countries that consider it excessive. Procedures applied are
overly complex and bureaucratic. The smaller the program, the higher the share of
administrative and transaction costs. There is also an information asymmetry by which
the units closer to the implementation level could gain advantage and dominate the
center.
There are certain managerial rules that are used to overcome the conflict of
interest at various hierarchies of the EU decision-making. Firstly, there is the principle
of subsidiarity that reflects the fact that the solution to problems and the control of costs
should be undertaken at that level of hierarchy, which has the best information. If the
relevant information exists at the grass roots, then the decision-making should be
decentralized to the local levels. The central level therefore should intervene only in
case of large deviations from the aims and retain the control over strategy and rules.
However, the most powerful institutions remain in the middle – with the governments
and the parliaments of the member states. They also demand a share in decision-
making. Thus the principle of subsidiarity is complemented by the principle of
partnership that is addressed to all potential parties concerned – the Commission, the
central and the regional governments, the local authorities, NGOs, social partners, etc.
The presenter of this paper expressed her opinion that the notion of partnership
under such circumstances is in fact an attempt to use the principle of partnership as a
substitute for the real subsidiarity where the initiative from below is too strong. The
hierarchical communication at the level of subsidiarity could be thus converted into a
horizontal communication at the level of partnership. The decision-making becomes
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spread over a too wide field and its transaction costs rise.  It reveals the existence of
some problems in the administration of the EU regional policy, especially in the
management of structural funds. It may be interpreted as an attempt of the center (the
Commission) to weaken the national level by communicating directly with the regional
authorities where the center can still dominate the field. One can have doubts whether
the new procedures for 2000-2006 will lead to a reduction of the overall administration
costs at all levels. Or rather, the burden of day-to-day implementation has been partially
shifted from the EU onto the national level, while the strategic decision-making and
possible sanctions remained with Brussels.
The principle of co-financing has its rationale: the European Commission wants
a high leverage and a multiplier effect of EU money. Subsidized programs shall attract
additional public and private resources, which would otherwise not be made available
by the member state. Thus the EU shares the risks, the costs and the expertise in
decision-making with the host countries, regions and localities. But there is also a
burden sharing between the federal and the regional levels. The latter try to maximize
the federal level’s commitment. In Austria, the shares in total national co-financing until
1999 were 1/3 EU against 1/3 at the federal level and 1/3 at the regional level. For 2000-
06 the rules changed according to the type of programs:
Regional programs:   0% EU, 4-6% federal, 5-6% regional, 70% private;
Inter-regional: 50% EU, 20% federal, 20% regional, 10% private;
Objective 3 (unemployment)  50% EU, 50% federal funds.
Austria’s contribution is approximately 2.5% of the EU budget, while its share
in the structural funds’ receipts is 0.71% representing 260 million EUR annually. That
means, for each euro received, Austria must pay 3.5 euros. In addition, each euro
invested from the EU funds is matched more than proportionally by domestic co-
financing. For Austria the structural funds are the most expensive form of subsidies.
From the economic point of view the EU subsidies suffer from the same inefficiencies
as the national subsidies. In fact, they are biased to even higher inefficiency. They are
considered by investors (as the users of funds) as a windfall gain that does not count.
Thus the providers hedge and try to earmark the funds, so that they are used
“appropriately”. That helps to avoid the most flagrant abuses but, on the other hand, it
decreases the flexibility of the highly entrepreneurial inventive investments.
Politicization of the structural programs is another serious problem. Politicians
tend to consider the EU subsidies as money that widens their room for maneuvering.
Thus they introduce into the decision-making also their own criteria related to their
political ambitions and/or expected impacts of funds on re-election of their parties. They
support projects giving them good image in the media and projects where they have
their electorate. The time horizon of politicians is short, so they prefer short-run effects.
The improvement in the performance of investments through EU funding is
expected to come if the system of grants is superseded by financial engineering. That
means, by a technique that has been successfully applied in the private corporate sector.
Higher involvement of the private co-financing, private guarantees, seed capital and
development-capital funds in the projects that are supported by structural EU funds, is
very important. Such improvements, like the guidelines introduced by the
“programming system”, have been an innovation in investment management for many
of the member states. After looking at the developments from the perspective time
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horizon, one can discover that the EU’s new approaches to investments are often more
innovative than the national aid schemes.
Table 2: Structural and Cohesion Funds: Annual Average Receipts of the Member
States – data for past 5 years and expected future developments**
EUR million, at 1999 prices Percent of national GDP of 1999Member states
1995-1999* 2000-2006 1995-1999* 2000-2006
Austria 234 262 0.12 0.13
Belgium 343 291 0.15 0.13
Denmark 127 118 0.08 0.07
Finland 260 299 0.21 0.25
France 2245 2238 0.17 0.17
Germany 3644 4252 0.18 0.21
Greece 3171 3555 2.70 3.03
Ireland 1313 568 1.57 0.68
Italy 3718 4237 0.34 0.39
Luxembourg    11    13 0.07 0.07
Netherlands 443 469 0.12 0.13
Portugal 3154 3251 3.03 3.13
Spain 7477 8036 1.34 1.44
Sweden 251 312 0.11 0.14
United Kingdom 2270 2371 0.17 0.18
Source: Austrian Ministry of Finance, Division II/4, 2000.
*  Commitment Appropriations
**Adjusted for transfer of EAGGF-Guidance expenditures shifted to category 1 in 2000-06.
    Cohesion Fund: average for 1993-1999
The phasing-out of funds for some regions or for some countries is a serious
political issue that will be challenged by the present receiving incumbents. Table 2 gives
an overview of data for 1995-99 and compared it with the expected appropriations for
2000-06. The cohesion funds are more important as a vehicle of politics of the EU than
as an economic instrument. It would be administratively much simpler if the net payers
would not have the right to receive the structural support at all. However, such an
arrangement would be extremely difficult to defend politically.
4.2 The Poor, the Unemployed and the Naughty – Some Good, Some Bad
and Some New Ideas on Allocating Structural Funds Among the EU
Members20
This presentation aims at being more analytical than the rest, by focusing on the
behavioral characteristics of the system, rather than on empirical facts. It emphasizes the
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existing conflict between the economic and the political aspects of the EU support
system. Politics seem to be an impediment to the continuation of the whole system in
the long run and it also weakens the economic efficiency of the structural funds. The
current system has some elements that allow the management to meet the economic
objectives: program planning, the principle of co-financing, speeding-up the adjustment
of the poor, concentration on the human capital, infrastructure and productive
investment, and the control over the absorption capacity.
If we turn to the critical aspects of the structural policies, we have to look first at
the focus on fighting unemployment, a target that politics in general, and policies of
national government, in particular, prefer. The structural funds, however, fail to address
the inherent economic causes of unemployment. The incentives offered by the
Structural Funds may therefore be wrong. At the same time there seems to be little
evidence that by defining the eligibility criteria by low relative GDP per capita levels
would provide a link for addressing also the high level of unemployment.
The second questionable idea is whether it is rational to follow blindly the
Agenda Approach where all members are expected to get the same treatment.
According to this scheme the position of beneficiaries is not symmetric, because
incumbents would receive too much, while the accession countries too little of the
available funds. Bargaining for the funds has showed a mentality that the structural
funds are subsidies, and fighting for these funds included too many “bazaar” elements.
In an enlarged union this would mean insufficient concentration of funds to meet the
objectives of the structural funds system.
In order that the transfers to the Eastern accession countries achieve a
sufficiently large scale to have a visible impact, we can ask the following question: how
can the present 15 EU incumbents save in order not to inflate the required total budget?
There are various approaches that would lead to different results. For example, the
scheme for inter-governmental compensation will hardly save any resources. The rule
that the accession countries should get the same amount of funds that the cohesion
countries received in 1999, would result in an annual saving of 20-25 billion EUR. The
rule that the transfers should be higher, the poorer is the country (and lower, the richer is
the country), could lead to a saving of 40-45 billion EUR. If the absorption capacity of
the recipients is objectively measured, and accordingly, the first wave accession
countries get a transfer of approximately 3% of their GDP measured at the present PPP,
and if we assume that their GDP would grow by 4% annually, then we come to 20
billion EUR of transfers per year (provided that the same rules are applied on them as
were applied on the cohesion countries).
The problem with the Pre-In Support seems to be that the later it is applied, the
more costly it may be in the future. Optimally, the accession countries should enter only
after their structural problems (i.e. real economic adjustments, adoption of the acquis,
sufficient development of human capital, etc.) are solved. Thus the more is done in the
pre-accession time, the lesser costs will be incurred by the EU after the accession.
Solidarity in this respect pays out. The presenter was of the opinion that an overstated
projection of the annual growth rates in the EU incumbents at 2.5% made the future
financing of the transfers look easier for the EU. However, mixing up of projections of
the growth rates for the accession countries (usually put at an annual 4%) in nominal
and PPP terms also make the predictions dubious.
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Three new elements have been introduced to structural funds financing recently:
the national approach, the allocation based on rules, and the principle of taking into
account the economic policy of the recipient member states. The first element is based
on subsidiarity what also implies regionalism. But the inclusion of growth poles and the
GDP criteria at that level (as an outcome of the Lisbon agenda) means that there will
arise the danger of less reliability of the data. The second element, concerning the
allocation based on rules, is a reaction to the present situation when the allocation is
based on the negotiation power. If the number of member states increased, for example,
from 15 to 27, the former system would become very complicated. The new approach is
based on the national GDP per capita related to the EU average. The individual
investment ventures, however, will be still constrained by the local absorption capacity,
which reflects also the efficiency and returns to investments. The recipient countries
therefore must also build their Community Support Framework for these purposes.
What is crucial for the final approval of the EU support is the consideration of
the parallel support from the national economic policy. The criterion used is the
orientation of the national policies of the recipient countries on growth rather than on
distribution. The problem here is which policies are growth-enhancing and how to
measure their outcomes. One could consider looking at the ratio of public expenditures
to GDP. Economists generally agree that a too high ratio of taxes (or public
expenditures) to GDP is an impediment to growth. Therefore if in a country the public
expenditure quota of GDP were above the EU average, the country should be called to
revise its policies and certain sanctions applied by the union. In the second step the ratio
of unproductive expenditure (e.g. on public servants and transfers to enterprises and
households) to total expenditure could be considered. If it is above the EU average, a
policy revision should be demanded. Full support to the planned development should be
granted only if both the ratio of public expenditures to GDP and unproductive
expenditures to GDP are below the EU average.
Discussion of Previous Two Presentations
A discussant expressed his doubt if the indicator of public expenditure to GDP
would be useful for the EU to use as a benchmark to evaluate proposed funding for the
new EU members. The candidate countries, in fact, can easily exceed the EU average
when trying intensively restructure their economies. For example, their public budgets
can invest heavily into infrastructure, or help with the restructuring of the industrial
sector. Similarly for the other indicator (unproductive expenditures per GDP) pensions
can be counted as unproductive. Would the conclusion be to cut on these expenditures
correct?
Christian Weise’s reply was positive. Yes, one must ask why the pensions
relative to GDP are so high in that particular country and if these funds collected by the
government could not be used better in some alternative way. It is also true that if the
share of public expenditures on GDP has been generally rising in time, we can ask if the
accession countries have chosen a correct policy, particularly if the level of these
expenditures in absolute terms was also high. Therefore later this share should be
decreased in order to receive additional EU funds.
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Another participant expressed his view that the fiscal policy indicators are not
the best ones to evaluate support to be granted for development policies because there
are large differences between the frameworks where they are used. Some wage policy
indicators could be used instead, particularly the unit labor costs. For example, in East
Germany or in South Italy the EU funds were spent on activities where the wages were
far away from the productivity.
A discussant asked about the Austrian experience. What were the reasons that in
the first years of membership Austria did not use all the funds that were available and to
which Austria was entitled?
Silvia Zendron replied to this question: The programs Austria proposed for the
usage of the structural funds were approved very late and thus the funding was just
postponed for later years. In the more recent period the rules changed and the funds are
available for spending in a firmly stipulated period. The creation of a status of pure net
recipient in any country is not recommendable, be it regions or sectors. The principle of
participation in the costs and sharing of risks has proved to be a more efficient strategy.
A workshop participant commented that the so much criticized bargaining
among the members of the EU about the extent and the conditions for the usage of
structural funds is in fact a constitutive element for the existence of these funds. Each
enlargement and each major policy change (e.g. the EMU) offer new potentials and new
challenges that require a new structure and new ways of operation. The widening of this
scope is also reflected in the increases in the amount of structural funds. The discussant
also pointed out that the rule that the intensity of the EU support should be higher, the
lower is the GDP per capita contradicts the principle of co-financing. If a country is
poor and needs more EU funds, it is less capable to support large inflows of funds by its
own co-financed resources. What are the solutions to this dilemma if the rules of the
game should be the same for all countries? Would it not be better if the rate of co-
financing would be lower (e.g. by 25%) for the less developed countries?
Christian Weise responded to the latter questions with an argument that the
percentage of co-financing is a relative term, as is also the maximum amount of the
structural funds in terms of GDP. Therefore the latter indicator ensures that the support
funds, even for a poor country, do not present a risk that the domestic co-financing
would not be able to provide sufficient matching. The problem is in the absorption
capacity that can be higher in some poorer regions than the limit up to which these
countries were eligible for receiving funds from the EU.
5. Macroeconomic Effects of EU Financed Programs:  Demand
Side Effects, Supply Side Effects and Problems of Absorption
5.1 Macroeconomic effects of EU Financed Programs21
The aim of this presentation was to inform the participants about the
macroeconomic experience of the so-called “cohesion countries” with the EU financed
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structural programs. The impacts are evaluated from the point of view how the policies
succeeded in fulfilling the objectives of the EU support. The methodology proposed
should also allow for comparing the efficiency of alternative investment decisions.
The structural funds are targeted in accordance with the following objectives:
• Promoting the development and structural adjustment of regions whose
development is lagging behind (Objective 1);
• Supporting regions affected by industrial decline (Objective 2);
• Combating long-term unemployment (Objective 3);
• Facilitating the occupational integration of young people (Objective 4);
• Speeding up the adjustment of agricultural and rural development (Objective 5).
The management of community structural policies includes the setting up of
Community Support Framework (CSF) aiming at promoting growth in its regions and
the Operational Programs that are co-financed by EU transfers and national sources
(public and/or private). The intensity of the CSF spending is illustrated in Table 3.
Table 3: The Size of CSF Spending in the Cohesion Countries
Indicator Greece Spain Ireland Portugal Four
countries
total
1989-1993
Total interventions (1994 ECU bn) 17.5 30.3 11.4 21.7 80.9
Total interventions in % of GDP 4.4 1.5 5.8 6.0 2.8
Community interventions in % of GDP 2.6 0.7 2.6 3.0 1.4
National interventions in % of GDP 1.8 0.8 3.3 3.0 1.4
1994-1999
Total interventions (1994 ECU bn) 34.8 82.2 13.1 31.8 161.9
Total interventions in % of GDP 6.9 3.1 4.2 6.6 4.1
Community interventions in % of GDP 3.5 1.6 2.4 3.7 2.2
National interventions in % of GDP 3.4 1.5 1.8 3.0 1.9
The above Community funds, coming as capital inflows of the CSF, plus the
matching domestic commitments of co-financing, have certain effects on the national
economies. Their estimation requires the measurement of impacts in the following
transmission mechanism:
Demand side:
• Public investment spending (e.g. infrastructure and investments of public
enterprises), as registered in the Public Investment Program;
• Improvement of human resources and skills that implies additional personal
incomes (secondary transfers to households) and additional profits of enterprises.
• Changes in the structure of productive capacities and the competitiveness in trade
that have impacts on the aggregate demand structure.
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Supply side:
• Long-run improvements in the productive capacity of the economy due to
investments into physical and human capital in various sectors.
CSF evaluation methodology is based on traditional cost-benefit analysis (usually
at the microeconomic level) or on macroeconomic structural modeling and its empirical
testing by using alternative development scenarios. In the past, the CSF impacts on
cohesion countries were modeled by a variety of macroeconomic models such as:
computable general equilibrium (CGE), input-output and various econometric models.
The presenter concentrated on explaining the latter approach. There the demand side
was described by behavioral equations for consumption, private investment,
government expenditure, exports and imports. The supply side of the model included
the determinants of the productive potential, such as infrastructure, labor, human capital
and investments (physical capital) as well as their impacts on the output. The analysis of
employment effects required the data on the labor market (labor demand and supply,
including  labor migration). The government sector had to be broken down into various
types of expenditure and the types of goods and services provided.
The empirical ex-ante estimation of the CSF effects (estimated for Objective 1
support) revealed that the impact on growth could vary by economies. For example, for
Portugal the average annual growth rate in 1989-1993 was estimated to increase by 0.7
percentage points - from 3.4% (without CSF) to 4.1% (with CSF). For Greece it was by
0.5 points, while for Spain, Italy and UK it was by only 0.2 points. The impacts on GDP
for 1994-1999 were even higher in all of these countries, ranging between 0.6 and 1
percentage points. The expected impact on job creation, albeit lower in terms of growth
rate than for the GDP, was also significant.
There are three conditions for a successful estimation of the CSF effects on the
economy:
• that the model describes the economic conditions for development correctly;
• that the CSFs are fully absorbed in the amounts committed (what influences the
demand side of the economy);
• that the CSFs are efficiently implemented (what influences the supply side and the
managerial capacities responsible for investment).
The obvious next question is: how the estimated impacts have been actually
realized in the real economies? It was assumed that the real effect should be lower than
the hypothetical effect because not all CSF expenditures could be absorbed under ideal
conditions modeled ex-ante. Some of the funds were not absorbed, or the marginal
efficiency of the additionally provided production factors (mainly in the fixed capital
formation) could have diminishing returns. The shortfalls in the real effects can be thus
further analyzed by the model and unveil the causes for such frictions. Economic policy
can therefore react and deal with the impediments.
Conclusions:
• The quantitative assessments of the CSF on recipient economies show that its
effects are significant, especially for the less developed economies.
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• The effects have been increasing in time, as the CSF was larger and the
management of funds was improving.
• In case we assume that the co-financing domestic funds were not be invested
without the CSF, then the impact on growth should be taken as double of the
results we have estimated for the CSF alone.
• The learning of the participants at all levels (EU, central national, regional and
local) and the improved governance of CSF has positive effects on the global
efficiency of CSF.
• CSF has an externality effect on the economic policies in the recipient countries,
since the management of CSF reveals various local leakages, frictions and
inefficiencies and exerts a pressure for their removal.
• The Euro-solidarity towards the South European regions has been particularly
important for their real economic convergence to the average EU levels of
income. Without it the closure of their development gap would most probably not
be  possible.
5.2  EU Transfers for Poland: Problems with their Absorption22
The presenter declared her position in the analysis of the EU transfers as that of
an observer detached from both the policy-making and the management of respective
funds. According to her observation, the aim of various national agents to maximize the
volume of support fund commitments from the EU is missing the point of economic
substance, or at least it is stressing a point of secondary importance. The essential thing
is how effectively these funds can be used. We can also ask if the proper absorption
means to use all the funds available and what policies should be used for their
management. The ambiguity in practical approaches was apparent immediately after the
publication of the document Agenda 2000. In Poland  discussions were characterized by
two different approaches: whether the funding proposed will be sufficient for the
country, and whether the existing procedures for administering and managing the funds
properly are adequate.
According to the Agenda 2000, the - by then - new member states should receive
5830 million EUR in 2003 from various EU support funds. The Polish share is expected
to be 3600 million, what is, without doubt, a significant amount. One of the practical
approaches to its efficient absorption is “learning by doing” what, in fact, could be
appropriate for the case of PHARE support. Unfortunately, the future EU funding will
be significantly larger than what PHARE used to be and the national losses caused by
their improper use could become too hazardous. The Polish problem now is how to
disperse the specific knowledge that was acquired so far in the five poorest regions that
were the recipients of EU structural and development programs. This transmission of
the know-how will certainly bring Poland more value added, than the fight for more EU
commitments. Provided that Poland received as much from the structural funds in 2003
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as calculated in Agenda 2000, there could be a serious problem with their absorption
and efficient allocation if local procedures and governance would not be changed.
Co-financing must not be treated as an additional cost of using the structural
funds. We can not rely solely on Brussels for financing our regional adjustments. It is
domestic regional investments that should be efficient in the first place. The other
problem of co-financing is to have it available in sufficient volumes when the national
budget deficits lead to expenditure cuttings in general, or when fiscal and monetary
stabilization policies become restrictive prior to the commitment of the exchange rate
pegging in the framework of the EMS. The national governments should assign this
agenda a high priority and build the working principles and policies in advance. Poland
should learn from the Spanish experience when during the first year of structural
support Spain paid more to EU budget than what it received because of the local
inability to generate projects that could meet EU requirements. Generating appropriate
projects, however, rely not only on the local capacities. The procedures for acquiring,
implementing and completing the structural projects require an enormous paperwork
that does not seem to be related to the substance of efficient investment. It would be
rational to press the EU for simplifying the procedures of the support programs .
Because the Polish government has doubts that the structural funds could be
absorbed at the volumes outlined, the present accession negotiations aim, among others,
at derogations on a part of the budget contributions. If we analyze the effects of the EU
assistance on the accession countries’ economies, the demand-side effects turn out to be
short-run, while the supply-side effects are those that influence the long-run
developments. The problem is what policy instruments should be introduced into the
governance of EU funds so that the former effects do not dominate the latter ones. In
fact, the productive competitiveness of the regions should be the main criterion for
making  strategic decisions. Surprisingly, it is also a quite recent development in the
discussion among incumbent EU member countries that the distributional aims of the
support schemes should not dominate the productive aims. As a consequence, an
eligible region that is not the poorest but that is able to propose an efficient project,
should receive a priority over a less efficient project from the poorest region. The
presenter suggested that it would be more suitable to help the poorer but less efficient
regions with assistance schemes that aim at education and human capital development.
Discussion of Previous Two Presentations
A workshop participant referred to the problems of estimation of CSF impacts.
The presentation of Sarantis Lolos has shown an optimistic picture, especially in the
Greek case. We can often hear a different message from other sources where the Greek
experience is depicted as less forward looking. Namely, that it took longer to learn how
to use the CSF efficiently and how to solve the problem of deep initial deficits. Is there
an advice what the accession countries could learn from Greece in order to avoid falling
into the same pitfalls?
Another participants remarked that the Greek co-financing of 50% looks too
high, once only 25-40% would be sufficient for running the project. Why was there
decided about that excessively high national contribution?
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A discussant turned to the methodology of macroeconomic modeling of the
effects of economic assistance. As there are so many different models with different
results, there are also questions asking which model offers the correct estimations? In
fact we should consider them as a whole. Some models, such as the input-output
models, illustrate very well the effect of the industrial structure and the demand-side
spillovers. The HERMIN model shows nicely the differences between the demand and
the supply sides, while the QUEST2 model, based on forward-looking expectations,
provides feedback on crowding-out, real interest rate and exchange rate effects. The
applications of the HERMIN model have received recently a particular attention. The
expected developments in the majority of accession countries have been already tested
through its simulation exercises.
If we consider the three most standard absorption problems – those related to
administration, co-financing and the macro-economy – the first ones are not so difficult
to solve if the institutions are set up correctly. The last one is more resilient. For
example, there may arise the so-called “Dutch disease” problem when the massive
inflows of capital boost a part of the economy, but the real exchange rate appreciation
destroys the competitiveness in other sectors. The discussant was not aware of any
macroeconomic model that would provide information to what extent the accession
countries were liable to such adverse effects.
One workshop participant expressed his view that in measuring the effects of EU
support funds the single criterion of GDP growth may not be sufficient. What also
matters, for example, is the change in investment and the impact on inflation. A higher
inflation with the presence of funds than the inflation expected in the basic scenario
leads to a conclusion that some of the investments were not used in an efficient way and
the domestic supply response was not very flexible.
Another workshop participant emphasized that the development of regions and
the co-operation over investment programs in organizational hierarchies are associated
with the development of democracy and the support of social stability. It means that
national decision-makers (e.g. the governments) should have a long-term vision, let us
say for 10-15 years, that goes beyond the scope of the “electoral political thinking”.
That would require establishment of institutions that are able to safeguard the continuity
of the “vision”. The European Commission and its structural funds are (or should be) a
part of such an institutional arrangement.
A discussant said that it would be important for the regional development to
accumulate a critical mass of structural investments that could ignite a sustained growth
even for the period when the EU financial injection would be withdrawn. The policies
applied for this objective can vary by countries. In some cases it may be just to provide
sufficient financing, but in other cases one needs investments into knowledge and
human capital in addition to given financial commitments.
The discussant raised the question of coherence of the EU transfers and the
Maastricht criteria based on an hypothetical situation. Let us assume that the capital
inflows from the EU are 3.5% of the GDP, and originally the state budget is fully
balanced, and its size is  of 50% of the GDP. Then the additional European Commission
funds will represent 7% of the budget and lead to a net public deficit. How shall we
consider the relevance of the Maastricht criteria and criteria for adopting the euro under
such circumstances?
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Another participant added to the conclusions of both presentations that there are
two sides to be considered if we judge the non-private inflow of foreign capital to a
country: first, how much effort and expenses both in cash and in kind it requires to
administer the inflows and second, what are the effects of such inflows. If 25% of the
money is used just for administration and if it requires the brightest minds of the
country to back up the administration procedures – it may be worth considering whether
would not be better if the resources were used in private activities, outside of the
bureaucratic schemes of public financing.
An Austrian workshop participant replied that that 25% of administrative
overhead cost is too much. The majority of EU projects, at least from the Austrian
experience, require much lower overheads. Co-financing, however, is quite a
complicated concept and goes into a combination of grants, loans, partnerships, etc., so
that a word “co-financial engineering” was invented to describe its procedures. The
level of co-financing, in fact, can be in conflict with the budget constraints, especially in
transition countries with prudent budgetary policies.
Another discussant pointed out that here the problem is if the EU funding
ventures selected are really effective for the domestic economy: if this is the case, then
the co-financing may go very high and the administration is simple. If, however, the
effects are low, or they are visible from the EU side only, then the forced national
participation can have serious problems. It would be then better if the funds are not
absorbed, but used in some other country.
Sarantis Lolos in his reply to the above discussion concentrated first on the
exchange rate effect of the CSF inflows. For long time, at least 30 years, Greece has
used to act under private capital account surplus. Thus the whole Greek balance of
payments has adjusted to such imbalances. We do not know how the part representing
the EU’s investments affected the exchange rate of the drachma. We know that there
were three depreciations in the last 15 years. It is theoretically correct to expect that
capital inflows result in an exchange rate appreciation, but we must also expect the
existence of various adjustments that may not direct the economy to the contraction of
the GDP or employment. Let us leave this problem to be judged by international
markets.
This relates to the argument about the Dutch disease when a (seemingly
positive)  exogenous shock causes that the economy becomes less efficient and its
growth stalls. The shock can be caused in some cases by a large foreign aid. Is such an
aid worth accepting? Most probably we never get an ex-ante signal about the adverse
global macroeconomic impacts of an aid. Then the only strategy remaining is to be
efficient at the project management level. In that respect the Greek experience is
positive, and the evolution from inefficient project management to an improved
performance had taken place. In addition, we know that the supply side of the economy
has received injections and incentives that increased its performance through the EU
transfers. The transfers were materialized mainly in the industrial sector where they
improved the quality of both physical capital and labor. The latter had also wide
spillover effects. For example, in Greece 25% of EU funds go into the improvement of
the human capital.
As for the estimation of effects of EU transfers, the models used give us
relatively reliable estimation of the effects on the demand side. The supply side is much
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more difficult to estimate. It depends on the model implemented because there can be a
wide choice between various theoretically expected impacts. For example, one can
consider or disregard the existence of crowding-out of private investments, or assign it
various weights. The vision behind the CSF is to provide opportunities to the economy
that would otherwise not come. It is not a vision for picking up of winners or for
decisions about the future structure of the economy. It aims at improving the conditions
and the functioning of the whole economy, especially the functioning of the markets.
In the last 10 years, investments in the Greek and Portuguese economy increased
faster than consumption, and the growth was also led by imports. We cannot say what
was the exact share of CSF in these developments. In all cases they played a positive
role. Under such circumstances the existence of domestic co-financing above the
required standards (i.e. the 50:50 ratio) is not surprising. It shows that this investment
was worth investing and additional domestic funds were spent on meaningful projects.
Elzbieta Kawecka-Wyrzykowska in her response to the comments explained that
the process of learning by doing is especially important in the EU structural schemes.
Unfortunately it takes time to have the system adjusted to a high level of performance.
The accession countries are therefore in a position where inexperience, risks and
uncertainty are large. Under such circumstances the possibility (and necessity) of co-
financing does not attract private investors. Therefore we should expect that the
domestic participation would come at the beginning mainly from public budgets.
6.  The Long-Term Effects of EU Transfers:  National Catching
Up and/or Regional Convergence
6.1  Empirical Evidence of Regional Convergence and the Role of
Structural Funds in the EU23
This presentation deals with questions centered round the income convergence
of regions, their catching-up dynamics and the experience of cohesion countries. What
kind of predictions on the likely impacts of structural funds can we make?  Are the
results compatible with the policy objectives? When one addresses the various schemes
of structural fund spending areas and assesses both their macroeconomic and local (or
regional) effects he/she has to be aware that a large part of the impacts are indirect.
It is an inherent characteristic of growth that it is not distributed evenly among
regions. There are various impediments to a uniform growth by all regions and the
efficiency of their elimination by policy measures also varies significantly. The
empirical approach of the presenter to these questions was mainly econometric, where
the hypothesis about growth factors is formulated and later estimated. The main
intervention areas, targeted at the growth convergence, included investment aid, build-
up of public infrastructure, and education. If we look at the convergence dynamics in
Western Europe, we can observe that up to the energy crisis in 1975 the catching-up of
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poorer regions was proceeding through a natural reallocation of factors – such as labor
and especially physical capital – that moved from developed to lagging regions where
the yields were higher. During 1975 through 1986/1988 there was observed a period of
regional divergence where the growth was endogenous and subject to innovations that
were concentrated in already developed regions. Thus rich regions got richer, while the
poor regions stagnated. The neoclassical equalization mechanism collapsed, and the
mobility of factors from rich to poor regions either ceased or was even reversed.
After the mentioned period of divergence, the convergence of countries in
Western Europe was again present since at least 1988. The incentives came mainly from
the escalating integration effect, as the new export markets opened up in Europe, and
FDI and other investments brought a wave of spillovers. Also the EU support policies
played a new role since the Structural Funds doubled after 1987 and reached 1.7-3.6%
of GDP in countries with GDP per capita lagging behind the EU average most.
However, not all regions responded in a uniform pattern. Some lagging regions received
new incentives and became dynamic (with growth above 3.5%), while many did not
react sufficiently and had even a negative growth.
If we analyze the factors that were important for high growth in the lagging
regions of the EU, we come to a conclusion that business investment, infrastructure and
human capital played the most pronounced role. Therefore also the policy instruments
were predominantly targeted to these fields. The presenter has shown the results of her
panel data estimations where the growth of GDP in regions was regressed on changes in
the accumulated private capital, public capital and human capital. The time series were
up to 20 years long. The closest positive correlation was received for the enrolment in
upper secondary education. Also the impact of public investment was significant, even
though one had to consider a time lag for real effects of these investments to take place.
On the other hand, the correlation between private investments and growth was weak.
The following conclusions can be made on policies that aim at the growth
promotion in the lagging regions:
• Promotion of human capital formation is the least risky investment, especially in the
new skills training programs and the upgrading of the educational systems.
• Spending on public capital formation, either directly or through its assistance
programs, has generally positive yields, especially in the build-up of regional
infrastructure.
• At the same time the danger of crowding-out is there, when public funding replaces
the otherwise successful private activities.
• Not all physical capital investments and incentive schemes have guaranteed regional
effects on growth. A part of such activities may miss the objective. Either its
spending is not used efficiently or the investment goes into sectors that do not
promote growth.
• On the other hand, there are lagging regions where the EU support is not essential,
even though its yields can be high. For example, some metropolitan areas can attract
sufficient private capital that would provide at least the same service as public
investments.
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6.2 The Trade-off between National Development and Regional
Disparities24
This presentation deals with the link between national development and regional
disparities measured mainly by the indicator GDP per capita. This relationship is not a
linear one.  It should be mentioned that this hypothesis was actually formulated first in
1965 by Jeffrey G. Williamson (see Figure 1 and the comments underneath). High
national growth in modern economies is often concentrated in few regions (“growth
poles”) enjoying agglomeration effects caused by innovation spillovers. Thus, in the
early stages of catching-up, regional disparities among regions rise. Over time,
however, diseconomies (such as congestion or rising factor costs) force the capital to
move to other regions that were formerly at the periphery of innovation. Developments
in information technology, human capital improvements and knowledge spillovers can
speed-up this process. There is also a political pressure to eliminate the inequity by
economic policy measures. As the country becomes richer,  regional disparities are
therefore reduced. The relationship between income (national GDP convergence in
time) and regional disparities can be described by an “inverted U” graph. Some further
steps of the presentation are based on this hypothesis.
If we assume that all countries converge to the same “steady state” income per
capita in the very long run, the late entrants must get certain “bonus” on their growth
path in order to catch-up. This can happen without or with the help of the regional
policy. In the latter case the richer countries (regions) are taxed and the poorer countries
(regions) are subsidized. As an effect, the regional policy decreases the dispersion of
average incomes among regions and facilitates an earlier “take-off” of the late entrants.
The adaptation of technology and growth in lagging regions are thus speeded-up.
Regional disparities in income
        Income per capita
         y01   y02       y03       y11     y12
Figure 1: Trade-off between national and regional convergence – the Williamson
hypothesis.
Source: Davies, S., Garnier, C., and Hallet, M. (2000). Real convergence and catching-up in the
EU, EUROPEAN ECONOMY, No 71, 2000, p. 198
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 This section summarizes the presentation by Martin Hallet.
d1
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The so-called “Williamson hypothesis”, depicted in Figure 1, says that regional
disparities in catching-up countries follow the shape of an inverted-U curve over the
national growth path measured by income. Thus the same forces, which drive high
growth in such economies, are seen to generate first a widening and then a narrowing
of regional disparities in the per capita distribution of income. The important thing
here is that the growth in this case must be accelerated, otherwise the catching-up
would not be possible. The higher national rate of growth in catching-up economies
tends to be generated by the emergence of a limited number of growth poles, i.e.
growth leaders located in regional centers of development. They draw their
advantage for growth from the development of modern industries based on
“agglomeration economies”. These economies are characterized by knowledge spill-
overs and economies of scale. Private capital and skilled workers are attracted by the
new opportunities proliferating in the growth pole regions, leading to cumulative
rises in productivity and growth. Therefore the ascending side of the curve is
determined by the positive externalities in the growth poles due to agglomeration
(linkages, spill-overs, consolidated labor markets, etc.), while the descending side is
determined by the negative externalities from agglomeration (rising factor prices in
growth poles, congestion, etc.). The developing communication networks support the
dislocation of enterprises from the rich centers to the underdeveloped peripheries.
It follows from the model that a more rapid growth of certain regions (e.g. from y01 to
y02) leads to a widening of interregional disparities from d0 to d1. The regional
disparities are temporary. As the average income per capita goes beyond y03, the
disparities diminish due to spill-overs from growth pole to other regions. At the
income of y12, when the catching-up is complete, the disparities return to the original
level d0. It also follows from the model that it is rational to give the development of
the growth poles a policy priority and support the lagging regions at the later stages
only.
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However, there may be costs to the global development caused by such policy
interventions because the richer regions have to bear the burden of regional transfers
and their development and innovation leadership is impeded. At the end, all economies
can have lower income than what could have been achieved without the regional
policies. We can see that there is a trade-off between the objectives of high income and
unimpeded growth on one hand, and equity and cohesion, on the other.
There is also empirical evidence from the EU cohesion countries that confirm
that high growth is associated with growing disparities among regions. For example, in
Ireland the less developed regions have been losing relative to the Irish average
throughout 1991-1997. Nevertheless, the fast Irish average growth caused that even the
“poorer regions” were catching up with the EU 15 average in terms of gross value
added per person. We can therefore say that on the ascending side of the growth the less
developed regions may gain from the spill-over from the faster growing regions, even
though their relative position vis-à-vis the national growth poles gets weaker. Similar
evidence is provided by regional statistics from European transition countries, where the
capitals are leading centers of growth and their positive deviation in income relative to
the national average is higher the closer is their national GDP per capita to the EU
average. Figure 2 illustrates how the incomes per capita in the capital cities in Europe
differ from the national averages. With the exception of Bratislava, Prague and
Copenhagen, the dispersion between zero and +60% can be considered as normal,
irrespective of the GDP per capita of the country. Nevertheless, it is evident that capitals
are among the most important growth poles in the majority of countries.
We can hardly draw a similar conclusion for the more developed EU countries,
which are the objects to be caught-up. West Germany can serve as an evidence that can
illustrate the descending side of the catch-up. If we relate the income growth in various
regions with the average German growth, we can see that there was a tendency
throughout 1976-1996 to have faster growth in the urban fringe and the peripheral
regions than what was achieved in the agglomeration centers. We can pose a question
whether the European patterns of regional development are automatic, caused by pure
market mechanism, or whether they are caused by policy instruments following the
objective of regional equity. Some empirical evidence points to the latter. For example,
the analysis of the decentralized political system of Germany revealed that local
authorities had an impact on decentralized economic decisions and transfers. We can
generally assume that in the developed countries of Europe regional policies aiming at
achieving economic cohesion among regions have certain tradition and the trade-off
between high growth and regional cohesion was inclined for the support of the latter.
Therefore we can conclude that Europe is not offering much evidence on the
descending side of the Williamson curve that would point to the existence of automatic
processes towards regional cohesion as the countries become developed. The role of
regional policy is secondary in early stages of development. However, its importance is
rising in later stages. As the European countries grow richer, we can expect that their
regional policies aiming at higher cohesion will gain weight.
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Source: estimations of the author
Remark: 
The income values are GDP at purchasing power parity per capita
estimated for the EU, national and municipal incomes
Figure 2: Relative income of European capital cities
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
220
240
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140
National / EU = 100
Ca
pi
ta
l /
 n
at
io
na
l =
 
10
0
                        SK
                                CZ
                                                                                                      
                                                                                DK                            
         EE                              P                   F              
         PL              HU                                             B
            RO                                                UK               AT
    LV                          SLO                     FIN       IRL
                                                 E                  S         
           LT                                            
     BG                         GR                             IT         NL 
                                                                          D
Discussion of Previous Two Presentations
A discussant referred to Tondl’s presentation in which the importance of the
human capital development was emphasized, especially through the upper secondary
education. In several candidate countries, however, this is not a priority and the tertiary
education is promoted instead. Is there some more specific evidence that would point to
a crucial importance of the secondary versus tertiary education on the development of
human capital and its competitiveness?
Another participant asked if there is some evidence that would explain the
persistent lagging of Southern Italy (Mezzogiorno) behind the Italian average.
A discussant asked Gabriele Tondl for more evidence about her statement that
EU structural funds provide incentives for private investors in such a way that in their
decision-making they may be biased to accept participation even in cases where the
efficiency of the projects is low. Was this just a logical assumption to be further tested,
or did that conclusion come on grounds of empirical evidence?
Another participant expressed his doubts if we can measure the real convergence
in an objective way. The present methodology relies preponderantly on the income per
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capita and its distribution by regions. However, is this a reliable indicator of the
phenomenon tested? Would it be valid uniformly for all societies and their objectives?
The idea of structural policies, as mentioned by Gabriele Tondl, is that there
should exist a combination of three interdependent factors of development – education,
public investment and private investment. A failure in proper sequencing bears risks.
For example, the preconditions for catching-up of the most backward regions are such
that they cannot rely on private investors, be it foreign or domestic. The burden of
taking-off must be therefore borne by public spending mainly on education and skills
training. If the accession countries have the most backward regions from the whole EU,
then their pattern of catching-up should rely primarily on these two factors.
The divergence of certain areas can be a normal process in all countries and we
should distinguish between relative and absolute losers. Since we do not live in a closed
society, the comparison can be done in relationship to numerous alternative
benchmarks. A phenomenon perceived originally as a “lagging behind” can be also
interpreted as an “overtaking”, if we change the point of reference. Thus a region can be
losing relative to some extremely fast growing country (or even to a domestic average),
while it is catching up relative to EU average. Similarly, one cannot interpret the
position of some very rich regions as leaders, once the tax burden brings their
international competitiveness to a halt.
A commentator added that the perceptions of lagging behind and the motives of
the  individual actors should be considered. Does any authority, positioned in the top of
administrative hierarchy, have rights to force a certain part of the population that
revealed their preferences in abstaining from GDP growth, to an activity of catching-
up? Especially it should be the case when a widening gap in the GDP per capita in one
region does not have negative externalities on the more “prosperous” regions. The
decision about the policies directed on higher “cohesion” should therefore remain
exclusively on the local community. As a follow-up of this principle, the distribution of
the EU structural funds should be decentralized as much as it could be technically
possible. Similarly taxing of the rich can be vindicated only on grounds that the tax
revenues will be used for the financing of public goods that can have externalities
improving the future position of the taxpayers. Otherwise the support of the policies
aiming at gaining a balanced growth among regions should be left on their private
philanthropy and solidarity.
Gabriele Tondl answered some of the questions. The enrolment in the upper
secondary education was taken as a useful proxy for the estimation of the human
capital. First, it was the statistics best available that could cover all compared regions.
Second, its correlation with the indicators of development was the highest among all
other alternative variables of education.
With respect to the problem of low efficiency of private investments in some
regions, one has to look at the data and single out those regions where the private capital
had high share in total investments and at the same time low returns. Speaking
generally, it was found in South Italy and Central Spain. These findings were closely
correlated with the occurrence of high incentive schemes. It is very probable that
without these schemes the investments would not have been undertaken. Also other
research results (e.g. those of the World Bank) confirmed that in some areas there is no
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evidence for a positive relationship between private investment and high growth. The
explanation rests on the distortions caused by subsidies.
One could agree that the GDP per capita is not a perfect measure for decisions
about the structural policies. The real studies use therefore a complex system of
indicators, including for example the index of social inequalities or unemployment.
The theory of endogenous growth stresses that the interventions should address
the supply side of the economy and support the development in those fields that have
wide externalities. These conditions are best satisfied by public investment into
infrastructure and education. Though some of them can fail and miss the objectives, it is
not an argument that all such schemes should be renounced completely.
The divergence among regions should be measured in relationship to a very
wide set of countries and regions. For the purposes of decision-making about the EU
structural funds, it should be optimal to measure it across all Europe. On the other hand,
the policies of national convergence should be based on information at lower levels than
the EU.
A discussant questioned the relevance of the Williamson hypothesis presented
by Hallet for the recent developments in Central and Eastern Europe. The present
situation in these countries is also a result of sharp decline of production, while the
catch-up process for the majority of them is ambiguous. For some of them lagging
behind the EU average has actually increased and the disparity among their regimes has
widened.
One of the participants was of an opinion that there was certain logical
inconsistency between the results of empirical observations by Martin Hallet and his
policy principles outlined by the theory. Namely, that the real policy interventions in the
European Communities were aimed at the speeding-up of the take-off of the poor
regions already in the very early stages of development when, by his theory, the
interventions were not supposed to be important. Then, in the later stages, the
convergence would be more automatic, requiring less the policy support.
A workshop participant mentioned that as to the functioning of the
agglomeration effect, in both of its periods – expanding and contracting – the
presentation of Martin Hallet did not mention the importance of labor migration and its
changing flows in time. This is all the more surprising that the whole theory of national
and regional disparities (developed, among others by Jeffrey Williamson) relies on the
presence or  possibility of migration.
Another participant referred to the final conclusion of Martin Hallet’s
presentation where he posited that the role of regional policies would rise as the
countries develop and the lagging regions would catch-up with the previous leaders. In
the original literature this hypothesis was assumed only. Was Hallet’s statement
supported by more specific empirical evidence that would not contradict the hypothesis
tested? One could have also tested the following reverted hypotheses for the period of
“taking-off”: first the authorities would provide incentives for the development of the
growth pole in order to build-up strong leaders of innovation in the agglomeration
centers. Then, in the later period, they would let the market do all adjustments to a
higher regional cohesion, as the spillovers from the leading regions divert the flow of
factors to lagging regions.
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A commentator mentioned that in our debates we have somehow forgotten about
the importance of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) on the structural
developments. The question is to what extent the CAP has contributed to a balanced
regional development and what was its impact on reverting that trend, especially due to
its subsidy mentality, towards enhancing  disparities and conserving the social
inflexibility.
Martin Hallet apologized that, due to his concise presentation, he caused some
misunderstandings among the audience. For example, it would be a mistake to assume
that the presented figure showing disparities between the European capitals and the
countries’ average incomes was pointing to significant behavioral differences between
the western and eastern economies. It would be also a biased inference to say that once
the capitals reach the double of the national average per capita income, the optimal
policy would be to invest in the poorest regions and not to the capital. Maybe the
opposite policy would be more efficient for bringing the whole country on a more
balanced and a higher growth path.
As to the importance of the labor mobility in the Williamson’s hypothesis, we
should make the things right by admitting that factor mobility should be in the core of
the problem. The condition that technologies should be available to all regions can be
satisfied only if the human capital development or migration are not impeded.
In Mezzogiorno, and also perhaps in East Germany, there are regions where the
catching-up cannot rely solely on market automatism. What is specific in these regions
is that they are in the neighborhood of highly developed domestic regions. But we can
doubt that it is their revealed preference for backwardness, what is the reason of their
lagging behind. There are other explanations. For example that the gap is so wide,
particularly if combined with fiscal policies causing a rent-seeking mentality, that the
spillovers find it difficult to cross it over and take roots.
There was a comment on the appropriateness of regional policies in the early
stages of catching-up at the expense of fast growing regions. In fact, the problem should
be exposed to a wider context of the national development strategy that deals with
public investments, infrastructure, education, R&D and institutional incentives, among
others. From that point of view regional policies at the early stages will become of a
secondary issue. Creating bottlenecks in the main growth poles and promoting the low
growth regions may not be an optimal policy for achieving a high global growth, since
the foregone investment in the center may result in an opportunity cost that is not Pareto
efficient.
The CAP has various objectives. Though it is not its main target, it has also a
stake in the objective of a balanced regional development. Unfortunately, there were
only few studies that analyzed it from this point of view. It seems to be apparent that the
CAP is not a suitable instrument to address the problem of the regional cohesion
properly. The CAP promotes the development of large-size agricultural firms located
mainly in developed northern regions (for example in Germany, Denmark, the
Netherlands and France). Actually it may pursue just the opposite strategy that is
followed by the cohesion funds.
One of the workshop participants added that policies aiming at the reduction of
disparities split our societies into two groups: the so far winning majority that supports
the policies and the opposition. There are various reasons why the structural policies
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should not be used. First, we should use the advantages of a unique location and attract
the people from less favorable regions to those regions that got on a path of high
growth. We should refrain from trying to shape all locations to a similar pattern, what is
often an activity going against the substance of naturally developed dissimilarities. In
some cases it is the specific local environment that rests behind the “disparity”. Many
areas with economic disadvantages can then find their comparative advantages in other
activities than production. For example, they can become natural or historical reserves,
the main business of which is in tourism.
Another participant pointed out that the macroeconomic explanation of certain
policies could be misleading. For example, an aggregate relationship between growth
and public investment statistics, that seems to offer a plausible correlation in general, is
often used as a justification that a whole set of individual projects, often taken as a
program, should be undertaken. The causality in that case is flawed, since each project
has its specific factors and therefore should be evaluated to that extent separately. The
constraints to the local growth can vary by localities and the cost of their removal can be
also very different. The availability of a skilled staff for project analysis and
programming is therefore the most important precondition for any investment.
Unfortunately, many regions and projects lack just this crucial factor for their
development, what they try to hide under the fig leaf of general statements.
A discussant agreed that the role of capital cities in generating growth in Central
and Eastern Europe is large and their promotion is important. Unfortunately nearly all of
the regions of capital cities will not be eligible for a support from the structural funds
because the average GDP per capita in EU will decrease after the EU Eastern
enlargement and already now some of these cities have income above 70% of the
present EU average. That is a strange new situation harming the new entrants. In the
past, Dublin, Lisbon and Athens have been for long the active players of the structural
support game and their contribution to the local growth was acknowledged. The
newcomers from Central and Eastern Europe, with their even less developed economies,
will now be excluded from these highly efficient investments.
A discussant was at the opinion that the speakers up to now commented
extensively on the real factors that they found essential for the convergence. However,
we should not forget about the monetary factors that may become a part of the structural
policies. For example, a premature adoption of the common European currency can
make the domestic cohesive policies less efficient. Speaking purely theoretically, would
it not ease the problems of South Italy to stay away from the euro-zone? The same
question, dealing with the optimum currency area, can be raised for the accession
countries.
Another participant returned to the policy recommendations that were mentioned
by Gabriele Tondl. The structural fund interventions should always use sector-neutral
and competition-neutral instruments. In selecting the projects these instruments should
not act against the market signals. The incentives to education and infrastructure are
consistent with the first two principles. Nevertheless, there were observed investments
in the Mediterranean region, which were inefficient, that could happen due to a
disregard of the market principles. What other instruments, except for subsidies and
grant schemes, the EU can apply in order to minimize the risk of cost inefficiency? For
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example, should not the funding be rather directed to the usage of refundable
instruments, such as credits or risk-capital funds?
Gabriele Tondl in her answer to the comments responded first to the problem of
causality and reasoning for a good investment. We can argue that the high income in a
country was caused by investments into education, or alternatively, that the latter was
rather an effect of the high income. TO identify the causality one has to rely on
sophisticated statistical instruments where the role of time factor and lags can be
estimated. However, it is a general problem of human perception that is not easy to
solve.
Monetary factors definitely play their role in the process of convergence, even
though it would be excessive to refrain from a fixed exchange rate regime (or even
euro-zone) only on grounds of structural objectives in some region. What was more
important for the promotion of regional convergence was the monetary and fiscal
macroeconomic stability, as we can observe it from the time series data for the South
European cohesion countries.
As far as the usage of selective investment incentives is concerned, she supports
the instruments that would be compatible with the market economy and neutral to the
competition among sectors. In the past we could observe a process of learning when at
the beginning there were not used structural instruments in Southern Europe that would
allow for selectivity. Recently we could hear voices recommending the introduction of
the principle of conditionality. For example, if the investment would not be profitable,
after some period some refunding could be considered as a part of the incentives.
Martin Hallet in his reply disagreed with the view that disparities do not
represent a problem for an economic concern. For example, the descending side of the
Williamson curve reflects the negative externalities of agglomeration and congestion.
The markets, due to the public good nature of the problem, need not solve the resulting
deadweight losses efficiently.
The eligibility or non-eligibility of capital-city regions for EU structural funding
is a very serious issue and the candidate countries should care much more about the
status of policies of these regions. The monetary policy and the exchange rate have not
proved to be efficient instruments for the governance of structural policies. Currently
the problems of EMU and the criteria for optimum currency area are not at the forefront
of discussions in that matter. One must agree, however, that stable macroeconomic
conditions are crucial for a balanced development, what concerns also the efficiency of
public investment spending.
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7  Options of Program Selection:  Supporting Losers or
Winners, Enhancing or Correcting the Market Mechanism
7.1  Supporting Losers or Winners in the Latvian Context25
The presentation started with a comparison of the GDP per capita levels at
purchasing power parity for EU candidate countries in 1998 with similar statistics for
the EU. In ranking, Latvia is at the bottom, just behind Lithuania and Bulgaria (or close
to the bottom, if one adjusts the statistics to differences in methodology). It means that
in catching-up Latvia will require certain efforts in order to get at some proportion of
the EU average in a stipulated time. For example, starting from a position of 17.1% 26 to
reach 50% of the EU average would require an annual growth of 5.7% in 50 years, if the
EU’s annual growth were 2%. It looks like a big task – but, if taken in historical context,
it need not be an achievement which is exceptional. It may be enlightening what the
Hungarian economic historian Iván Berend recently showed: countries in Central and
Eastern Europe have been standing for more than 125 years at the average of 40% of
GDP per capita of the countries in Western Europe. They neither outperformed the
Western countries, nor converged to their average level, though there were some
fluctuations in time. What is even more surprising, their best relative standing was
during the first stage of state socialism.
Though the task of transition economies is just a partial catch-up with the EU
countries, it is evident that the EU structural funds will have only a small impact on the
whole development. It was therefore interesting to learn from the presentation of
Gabriele Tondl (see the previous section) how a combination of EU funds and domestic
funds could improve the provision of public goods and have externalities on the
production in the private sector. One of the basic problems in poorer accession countries
is the lack of effective domestic resources for co-financing, as the expenditures are pre-
assigned to certain politically binding ventures whose yields may be lower than the
yield of projects supported by structural funds. Therefore a serious approach to
accession implies that accession become a government task of top priority. In Latvia the
pre-accession funds were finally linked with the National Development Plan (NDP).
The first was published in November 1999, and the second one is in the process of
submission to the cabinet. The objectives of the NDP were defined as: “Identification of
those sectors of national economy which would be eligible for support from the
Structural Funds in the future and which can contribute to the development of the
economy and to the narrowing of the gap in economic development between Latvia and
the EU”.
We could hear at this workshop from Ruth Downes that there was much
confusion about the structural funds and about the evolution of ways how they were
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 According to more recent revised statistics, the Latvian GDP per capita was 22% of the EU
average. As can be seen, the methodology of the GDP estimation at purchasing power parity
also evolves and the new estimations give generally higher figures for the transition countries,
than in the past.
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prepared and implemented in EU countries. A similar situation happened in Latvia
where the national authorities had inadequate expectations how the pre-accession and
structural funds could have been acquired and used. The list of tasks in the National
Development Plan of 1999 could be characterized more as an ideal “shopping list” than
a project for investments under budget and absorption constraints. The Plan identified
six economic policy goals, which corresponded to six separate investment programs:
• Promotion of entrepreneurship;
• Regional development;
• Tourism development;
• Agriculture, forestry, fishery and rural development;
• Economic infrastructure;
• Human resources development, including employment promotion.
The Plan was subject to criticism from various sides and subjected to a profound
revision.
The Plan worked out in 2000 offers more information and also its form has
improved. It presents a list of strategic policy goals and a time frame for 2000-2002,
even though it does not contain a detailed financial plan. It is expected that the financing
will combine funds of domestic private and public sectors, plus the contributions from
the World Bank, EBRD and the EU pre-accession funds for projects in infrastructure, as
well as the aid to the private sector (subsidies) and the aid to the development of human
capital.
There are five strategic objectives outlined in the new NDP:
• Sustainable national development;
• Regional development - elimination of regional disparities while preserving
“valuable  differences”;
• Education, cultural growth and “competitiveness” of the population represented by
the human capital;
• EU accession;
• Improvement of public administration system and development of democracy.
The investment projects are classified according to priorities. For example, one
of the highest priorities can be received if a project will “diversify and re-orient the
production to high value added products”. That may sound more like a task of picking-
up the winners than enhancing the market mechanism. The problem is also to find out
what is a product with “high value added”. It is not certain whether it is a value per ton
of the product, share of profits per price, the value added per labor, or simply a
synonym for hi-tech products. Other criteria for priority are “the development of healthy
business environment and funding resources”, “economic infrastructure”, and such tasks
like “improvement of workforce qualifications in line with market needs”, and “impacts
on the efficiency of public administration”. As a supplementary priority we can find
there “social integration”, “social infrastructure” and “regional development”.
The NDP is expected to receive a financial support equal to 6.1% of GDP in
2001 and 7.1% in 2002. A half of it will come from domestic public funds and two fifth
from the EU pre-accession funds. The rest will be provided from private co-financing.
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What is the role of economists once there is an attempt to set up an NDP? Their
objective should not be picking the winners, because this should be done be the
entrepreneurs who are the professionals qualified especially for that purpose and who
risk their own property if they fail. The economists could maximally strive for
identifying the areas in which the market fails and suggest ways for a correction. For
example, there may be cases where financing of small businesses fails and public
intervention may aim at improve the situation. They should also support the creation of
conditions, environment, infrastructure and institutions for private activities to act better
as the market signals become more pronounced.
The presenter concluded by commenting on the Irish model for development.
Surprisingly, we can find a large number of Irish consultants operating in the Latvian
ministries. However, transplanting certain experience mechanically to a situation where
the local conditions are different may be hazardous. In Ireland the structural funds were
used widely and successfully for the improvement of human capital. The Irish
educational reform started in the 1970s, well ahead of the rest of EU, and its focus was
on training (especially married) women that were outside of the labor market at that
time. The EU structural funds were able to build on that base. But a similar policy may
not be as successful, if adopted in Latvia. Another policy that was behind the economic
success in Ireland was the creation of a culture of accountability and incentives to
reward those who create wealth. In this respect the Irish experience is of a paramount
importance and the structural funds could be used most efficiently in Latvia if they
could contribute just in that direction.
Discussion of Previous Presentation
A discussant asked how the three Baltic countries are going to co-operate both in
the fields of transformation and in the policies aiming at EU accession and how
Scandinavian financial capital, public administration and industrial know-how can be
used for the benefit of the Baltic?
A Polish participant asked about the process of preparation of the National
Development Plan of Latvia. Namely who were the social partners in that process and
how intensively have they been involved? The discussant also commented on the goals
of the Plan and the structure of expenses. While we could agree with the objectives as
set out in the Plan, the financial tables, however, indicate that two thirds of outlays went
into infrastructure and very little was provided for the development of human resources.
In the long term this may be a great mistake. For example, it was found out in Poland
that its eastern regions had weaker absorption capacity of the funds for structural
development. Therefore it was decided that this capacity should be enhanced by
investments into its human resources.
Alf Vanags replied that the Baltic states are not very much like each other, and
the idea of them co-operating in some kind of a collective endeavor is a fantasy. If we
take the Central European countries as a yardstick, the Baltic states are definitely neither
more flexible and, in a similar fashion like the former, nor they would be able to
negotiate the EU accession together. The Nordic countries are important partners for the
Baltic states, though. Especially much of the FDI comes from these countries. Finland
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became a crucial ally for Estonia because of their ethnic and geographical closeness,
and a part of Estonia’s success should be attributed to that alliance.
The main responsibility for getting all kinds of social partners “on board” rests
with the ministries. They have been very reluctant to open their network for the NDP
development to a national-wide discussion, but it is true that they were under strong
time pressure.
A discussant pointed out that his earlier analysis of the role of education in
Europe indicate that Finland could be considered a country with a particularly intensive
orientation to education. Giving the young people the chance for a high quality of
education has been one of the local highest moral values for centuries. Especially in
time when the country was relatively poor the access to education was considered the
best investment. Turning to the recent Irish success we should not forget that Ireland
had the youngest structure of population in Europe because of the highest fertility rate
for the last 30 years. Otherwise Europe is a rapidly aging continent. Therefore the
investment into information technologies was much attracted by the structure of the
population in Ireland.
A discussant, based on the experience of Lithuania, remarked that to judge a
national plan is very difficult on the mere definition of goals and criteria on one the
side, and how the actual process of selection for the support to losers and/or winners is
implemented, on the other side. Both sides can be, to a large extent, independent.
A Hungarian participant commented on the level of development and growth in
transition economies. The Latvian slow growth in the first period of transition cannot be
taken as a representative sample. Growth can become much faster in the later period of
transformation. For example, in Hungary the growth suddenly accelerated and showed a
cumulative 20% during 1995-98. GDP in transition countries has been grossly
underestimated, for example in the housing sector, among others. The methodology of
the GDP estimation, as it approaches the standards of Eurostat, has had to be adjusted,
and the prospects for catching-up suddenly became more optimistic. Another discussant
added that the recent statistics coming from EU about the level of GDP per capita in
candidate countries relative to the EU had been upgraded and they are different from the
figures provided in the past by other institutions. The difference can be more than 13
percentage points in some cases.
Alf Vanags replied that the usual measures of education and its achievements are
problematic to define. In Latvia there is a high enrolment in both secondary schools and
universities. The problem is in the attainment of quality. The teachers are badly paid and
the universities are generally not very good. As there is a big institutional inertia and a
low mobility of teachers, the schools are very difficult to reform. The legacy of the
Soviet approach, which inclined to provide mass low quality education, is still visible in
Latvia.
As to the process of selection of projects in the NDP, which should be funded
from domestic or international public resources, we can see the structure of aggregate
spending only (e.g. 29 million lats for agriculture, 40 million to the support of small and
medium enterprises, etc.). The NDP does not yet offer instruments for monitoring a
competent and competitive project appraisal.
71
8  Special Institutional and Policy Tasks in Sectors:  Agriculture
and Transport and Infrastructure
8.1 Experience of Preparation of the SAPARD Operational Program for
Poland27
The presenter has spent the last two years in the Polish Mission to the EU and
therefore his message reflects his personal experience from the negotiations for
accession. He specializes in the problems of agriculture and therefore he talks about the
pre-accession support to that sector – mainly through the “SAPARD” framework. It is
expected that the issue of Polish agriculture and its rural areas will be the most difficult
problem to overcome before the negotiations for accession could be concluded.
A couple of years ago both the Commission and the Polish government have
changed their approach to this problem. Originally the evaluators concentrated mainly
on the issue of an over-sized potential capacity of the Polish agriculture. The
agricultural land per capita is twice as large in Poland than what is the EU average.
Would the Polish agriculture be developed more, as was assumed, it might threaten the
stability of the EU markets. In the meantime, however, the Polish side has shown that
Poland was also a big importer of agricultural products. Actually it became a net
importer, and not only in  tropical and subtropical fruits, but also in products produced
domestically. Though it may be a result of present domestic structural deficiency, the
changes cannot be expected to be solved soon.
The whole problem has later acquired a different dimension. Polish agriculture is
over-populated and the income earned there is low. Therefore there is a danger that,
following accession, the rural inhabitants will try to find jobs abroad and threaten the
labor market in the EU. There may also arise problems in Poland as the poorly paid
peasants become unemployed, they could burden the social security net with high costs
and threaten the social stability in the country. We should be aware that a part of the
Polish successful transformation happened thanks to the existence of private plots.
Labor dismissed from contracting industries after 1989 could find job in family
agriculture businesses and survive there the most dramatic years of transition.
In the meantime, the standard of living in the Polish non-agricultural sectors
improved significantly and the gap between them and the agriculture was widening. The
government, in order to support domestic agriculture, impeded the import of competing
products from abroad and provided various subsidies to the farmers. Approximately 3
billion euros are used annually as state budget support to the farming social security and
pension system, what became a too heavy burden to future fiscal developments. Given
the protection and the ensuing inefficiencies, local prices of agricultural products
increased above the EU level. Therefore also the demand has been artificially restrained.
However, the problems with pent-up imports became apparent: they are not only
cheaper than the domestic production, but  pressure by foreign suppliers and their
governments on international negotiations was also rising. Another consequence was
that  Polish agricultural production lost a lot from its international competitiveness. The
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domestic farmers are also dissatisfied and their collective protests against the
government raised wide public attention.
It has become evident that the degree of domestic protection got to a point where
no further intervention is possible. The main way for improvement rests in restructuring
and improvements in productivity. In difference to industry, restructuring in agriculture
was being postponed. Neither the number of farmers nor the number of farms has
decreased in the past years of transition. The farming sector should reduce its labor
force and by decreasing the excessive labor costs it could again become competitive
both at home and abroad without the need of a special protection. The problem is that
there is no demand for the expected surplus of less skilled labor in the industrial sectors.
Neither we can see much potential in absorbing that part of the population by the cities,
nor in their migration abroad. Therefore the only logical solution is that the excess
agricultural labor remains in the rural areas and find new working opportunities there.
It is without doubt that this very ambitious plan is not without problems.
Presently 50% of income in the rural areas depend on farming. Fortunately, the
transition in Polish agriculture can be spread over a generation. The government
strategy is to balance the support for the transition of the rural areas between the
agrarian incumbents and the new opportunities outside agriculture.
The expected role of the EU structural support to Polish agriculture, namely
through the SAPARD program, should be viewed in this context. The preparation of the
program has started just recently, even though there was a delay from the expected date
of 1st January 2000. The signing of the Financial Memorandum with SAPARD Agency
was expected to be at the end of 2000 and the first projects could receive the funds in
2001. In the meantime we should solve the accreditation of the paying agency and
establish the proper institutions that would manage the projects. The amount of funds to
be disbursed to Poland is EUR 168 million. Most of the money will be spent on
improvements of food processing and the infrastructure in the rural areas, though the
farmers preferred direct investments into their own production. That was not accepted
on ground that the chosen alternative would provide them more benefits indirectly.
Poland’s cooperation with the SAPARD Agency has been very fruitful and businesslike
so far. We were also glad to hear that our proposals and projects were not considered
worse in their standard than what the agency was accustomed to receive from the
member states.
8.2 Transport Infrastructure in EU Enlargement and Integration28
The issue of infrastructure was raised many times at this workshop, what often
implied that its role in the decision-making about the use of structural funds had one of
the highest priorities. The presenter raised a somewhat skeptical view of this because it
simplified the matters too far. His research was originally undertaken on demand from
British authorities with an objective on “trunk road assessment”. Its aim was to test the
link between transport growth and economic growth, in order to find an answer to the
question if we could sustain the level of economic growth without investments into
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transport infrastructure. This is also a problem that has relevance for the economic
integration of accession countries with the EU. The message of his research is as
follows: do not get carried away with infrastructure in general, but remember the
importance of developing the markets for transport services. Transport itself is an
industry that depends on markets whose development increases its efficiency. Thus an
investment into a better market intermediation can be an efficient alternative for a
constant enlargement of existing infrastructure.
What is the role of EU in transport and transport infrastructure? The problem is a
multi-dimensional one. First of all there is the fact that the traffic growth in Europe has
been greater than the growth of GDP. Secondly, there was an important model switch to
road transport that has become pronounced recently in the Central and Eastern European
countries. Motorization and the importance of car ownership is a phenomenon that has
been running at an alarming rate. The extremely high income elasticity of the demand
for cars in accession countries is worrying. There is a political message that the
mistakes made in the West in the transportation policy should not be repeated. The
congestion and environmental costs are not an inevitable price that must be paid for the
development. A new policy initiative should be required for a change. Unfortunately, in
many countries the politicians are vulnerable to popular opinion and protests against
such measures like the taxation of fuel.
If we look at the transport growth in EU 15 during the period of 1985-1998, we
can see that the transport of both persons (in passenger kilometers) and goods (in ton
kilometers) grew faster than GDP. What is crucial, is that since 1993 the growth of the
transport of goods has accelerated significantly. The explanation can be found in the
deepening of integration due to the implementation of the Single Market in the EU.
Quite characteristically, it was the distance transported that grew faster, while the
weight of transport in tons grew less fast or fell. On the other hand, trade grew mainly in
intra-industrial commodity exchanges, so that similar commodities were transported
across Europe in opposite directions.
What concerns the levels of motorization, the United States achieved the level of
saturation in the early 1980s. Since 1990 the number of passenger cars per 1000 persons
has been decreasing, what was not the case in Europe, and especially of Central Europe.
The transport policy of the EU is enshrined in the Rome Treaty where it has an
important place together with agriculture. Unlike in agriculture, very little was done in
the transport policy until 1990. Since that time various initiatives commenced. In 1992 a
White Paper on the Future of the Common Transport Policy was published. It contained
two main contributions:
• Outline of needs for greater coherence in transport policy at the EU level,
particularly sustainability, safety, inter-modality and inter-operability.
• Call for a common approach to pricing to ensure fair competition between modes and
compatibility of national systems.
But then there was another set of documents that came as a reflection of the
Maastricht Treaty and the White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment
where the stress was put on:
• Competitiveness and cohesion
• Keynesian public works therapy of unemployment
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• All-embracing transport policy going up to an obsession with infrastructure.
The real issue came across later when Neil Kinock became the commissioner for
transport and raised the idea that the existing transport pricing was inefficient. That
concerns the ways how the long-term financing of infrastructure was arranged and how
the long run and the short run marginal prices were calculated. It revealed the obsession
with the high-level trans-European network, while the real issue was the way of
transporting people to work what makes the labor market more efficient. The studies
also turned to the analysis of transport intensity related to the growth of GDP and the
way how it contributed to the competitiveness of trade in both directions.
There are various myths about the infrastructure that should be debunked. For
example, the lobbies for an expansion of infrastructure stress its importance for exports,
but omit that the same pays for imports. There is also an argument that transport
promotes automatically the economies to scale, concentration and industrial
restructuring. The other naïve presumption that people are inclined to make is that
transport is (nearly) the only industry where competition is not perfect. Thus there are
expectations that the price of transport should be regulated and made equal to the
marginal cost, what can be a very costly intervention. Also we must reconcile with the
fact that transport cannot be made available everywhere and all the time. Therefore
some additional value of output, that transport might potentially mediate to some
locality (that represents the marginal increase in demand for transport), would never
materialize because the actual state of the market does not allow such a response on the
supply side. On the one hand, the absence of transport is used by firms to sustain their
spatial monopoly. On the other hand, the improvement of transport can increase a rent-
seeking behavior. For example, firms do not include the cheaper transport into their cost
by lowering the prices. Therefore the global impacts of transport development can be
both positive and negative.
One of the presumptions over-simplifying the argument is that there are wide
spillovers (both positive and negative) that can be interpreted as public good effects
from the transport. The conclusion is then made that it therefore does not matter so
much what the cost-benefit analysis says, because one can always add something
positive or negative in order to revert its results. The uncertainty about social costs and
social benefits is so large that it can be abused. It may be particularly dangerous in areas
where there are sensitive industries which are subsidized. For example, because of the
risks and uncertainties, the roads should not be built just in order “to improve the local
agriculture”. The diversified relationship between transport development, economic
competition, and the costs and benefits to production are quite complicated. We should
not forget their impact on restructuring (that is generally positive) and on externalities
that can contain many negative feedbacks, such as those of congestion and deteriorating
environment.
If we look at the effects of the transport on growth, we should look at the
relationship between the investments into the stock of transport infrastructure that acts
as a public good and the productivity of private capital in the rest of the economy.
Taken statistically, we can find a high positive correlation between them. The problem
is that we cannot be certain what is the cause and what is the effect. There are also other
effects that are not easy to capture, such as the labor market impacts working through
time savings and improved performance of the labor market, or the restructuring effect
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that includes  relocation impacts. The overall impact can be therefore ambiguous and
difficult to consolidate, although it is assumed to be positive.
In the analysis of transport investment programs we could assess separately the
cohesion effects (making Europe more integrated and balanced) and the competitiveness
effects. It is assumed that they go hand-in-hand, but that may not be always the case.
The net benefits arising from investment into infrastructure usually omit the existence of
various long-run fiscal burdens. For example, roads must be maintained from local taxes
what burdens the local enterprises. It is also difficult to identify the beneficiaries of
benefits. Often it is a different set of economic agents than was originally planned and
their location may be even outside of the region. The global benefit to EU can be very
different from the benefits received locally.
Project analyses usually have a tendency to give too much emphasis to the
macroeconomics of employment creation that is easy to estimate but difficult to prove,
while little attention is paid to microeconomic impacts on individual sectors and their
competitiveness and cohesion. There is an increasing evidence that new infrastructure
may lead to employment losses. If we look at the recent initiatives at the EU level, we
should mention TINA (Transport Infrastructure Needs Assessment) and its proposed
creation of 10 Pan-European “Helsinki” corridors and 4 Pan-European transport areas,
what includes 20.000 km of rail and 18.000 km of road networks at a cost of 90 billion
euros. The proposal reflects more the pragmatic political need to extend European
network to CEECs, that are still poorly integrated with the EU, than the specific needs
of these economies and the impacts on their regions. The problems with long-haul
corridors are that in some cases only a fraction of the total welfare effects fall into the
regions (or countries) in which they were built. On the other hand, there could be cases
where the wealth is actually transferred (e.g. via subsidies) from abroad into the regions.
That means, the regions can earn all the benefits while the contributing regions bear
only the costs.
The condition that financing for the most of the 90 billion euros should be found
internally places another burden on the project, because of the expected fiscal burden at
a time when accession would place excessive demand on public spending also in other
areas. The policy makers will have to make a decision whether the funds should not be
rather invested into alternative ventures, for example into human resources.
In sum, if we assess the process of setting policy objectives for the transport
infrastructure, and their real implementation and achievements, we can see confusion of
various kinds:
• The performance of the transport sector is analyzed separately from the needs of the
wider economy.
• Local competitiveness can develop differently from the objectives of cohesion.
• There is an emphasis on large prestigious projects of EU interest (such as road
corridors or high speed rail) to the exclusion of local projects which could have
wider local significance.
• A common appraisal framework is either absent or there is no co-ordination authority
that would make it applied.
76
• Alternatively, countries or regional authorities are reluctant to allow EU authorities
to take strategic decisions.
Discussion of Previous Two Presentations
A discussant remarked that the delays in providing the SAPARD program to
Poland did a bad service to the general perception of the EU support to accession
countries. Even though both negotiating partners are partly guilty, the exceptionally
cautious policy of the Commission to this matter was not justified. Another element that
harmed the image of agricultural aid was a cut in the budget. Originally the Agenda
2000, that has been known since 1997, offered a very optimistic view of the potential of
aid to be mediated by SAPARD. Polish expectations for the restructuring of agriculture,
however, could not be later satisfied.
Another participant mentioned that if we compare the funds provided by
SAPARD with the extensive cost of transformation that Polish agriculture must solve,
the ratio between them is very small. The key element for future development and
strategic policies rests on the expected changes in the productivity of agriculture. The
present productivity is estimated around 20% of the EU average. That does not sound
like a comparative advantage. If Poland enters the EU without a dramatic increase in
productivity in agriculture, the farming sector will remain very poor and its market
competitiveness would be at a margin of survival.
The other problem linked with the former is the concentration. Polish farms are
too small for modern farming techniques. Though the collectivization of agriculture
damaged that sector in other countries during the Communist period, the existence of
large plots is now recognized as an advantage. For example, the competitiveness of
agriculture in the Czech Republic   seems to be now in a much better situation than in
Poland just because of that factor. The role of the Polish government in solving this
issue is therefore paramount, while the role of the EU and its SAPARD Program is of
minor importance.
Another discussant stressed that the problems of the Polish agriculture have been
in the past underestimated and improperly analyzed. There is no foundation to a belief
that Polish exports might undermine the EU markets for agricultural production. The
real key factors of market penetration are not hidden just behind productivity. An
important role is played by the access to marketing mechanisms and contacts to main
distributors in the West that are apart from production. This should be made clear and in
advance – before the problem explodes. Once there is a strategy in the domestic policy
that the rural population should not move elsewhere, there will arise an enormous
pressure for both local and EU subsidies. A detailed co-ordination plan should be
prepared for the viability of such a policy. Without such a plan we will face serious
social problems and/or the need for even much more money to be spent later than what
could otherwise be the cost.
Wladyslaw Piskorz in his reply to the discussants said that because of the
demand of one member state during the final preparation of the Council regulations of
SAPARD a strange solution was decided upon which, to make it feasible with the
procedures of SAPARD, caused sufficient delay. Nevertheless, it would not be fair to
blame mainly the EU for these delays. The unfortunate true outcome of the negotiations
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is the disappointment among Polish farmers. There was another positive aspect
associated with SAPARD, namely the revision of some views of Polish authorities on
the rural development program. The prevailing strictly sectoral approach was modified
by giving preference to the development of businesses outside the farming sector.
What concerns the low productivity in Polish agriculture, we should be aware
that in this sector there exists a dual economy. Approximately 20% of the land belongs
to large-scale farming which is already competitive. Nevertheless, the EU experts are
not unanimous in their views that all small farms operate under the optimum size. There
are various externalities of the small-scale farming that make it sustainable. In
developing the rural sector we should combine the infrastructural improvements with
the programs on education and the labor market.
The average age of the owners of farms in Poland is now 51 years, what is quite
high. However, it was in fact declining after 1990, as the young workers employed in
industry had to return to the countryside. As we can see, the problem is not so much
with the age, as it is with the education of the children of farmers. The statistics says
that while 40% of the Polish population are residents in rural areas and 25% of total
employment is in agriculture, only 2% of university graduates come from farms. If the
young farmers lack education, they are not mobile enough to move out of farms and
thus they are deprived of opportunities. If this lack of mobility is combined with a loss
of competitiveness, that becomes a real danger.
By turning to the discussion of the presentation on the transport infrastructure
one workshop participant commented on the mercantilist obsession that was mentioned
several times at this workshop and also in the presentation – that the support for exports
is more important than the benefits that may come with improved import supplies. In
fact, the main reason for exports is that we want to have access to imports. Therefore
also the improved quality of import provision due to better transport is that what should
be counted.
Another discussant mentioned that recently, some less developed accession
countries had a very high spending on infrastructure. What could be the key
recommendations for the accession countries that intend to enlarge their infrastructure
by using the EU funds?
A workshop participant commented on the observed obsession with
infrastructure. During the previous discussions it was discovered that in EU programs
EUR 10 billion  has been approved for infrastructure development while, comparatively
to that, a negligible amount was assigned for the promotion of small and medium-sized
enterprises. Paradoxically, such disproportions in investments may originate not from
the higher levels of decision making, but from the lower levels of the hierarchy. For
example, if we look at the functioning of Regional Development Councils, their
preference for more projects for infrastructure development can be attributed to the fact
that such projects bear a low level of risks, even though they may actually fail. Public
roads usually do not go to bankruptcy. On the other hand, more efficient projects into
enterprises may involve higher risks because the cost-benefit accounting in them is
much more transparent. The risk of moral hazard in public decision-making and
lobbying at the local levels should be therefore considered, while the structural
decisions are made at the level of countries or the EU.
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Roger Vickerman in his reply agreed that modern mercantilism is not a credible
argument. The pressure on competition, increased efficiency and reduced prices, that we
can get as a result of the opening-up of regions through better infrastructure, may be
coupled with a short-term loss of employment. It must be recognized that we cannot get
both objectives at the same time – high employment and welfare effects of greater
competition. The trade-offs between  the global and local improvements involve some
strategic questions. The top-down approach would stress the competitiveness gains at
the level of the EU (or at the level of the countries) through concentrating resources in
certain areas to the exclusion of others. The excluded areas then do not get their
transport improved, because the overall effect is assessed to be greater. At present the
preference is given to the bottom-up approach, where every region has the right to
demand that its infrastructure should not be below the average standard. That may result
in a wastage of common resources.
As to investments into infrastructure we see that these investments in developing
countries reveal very high rates of return in the early stages. The rates are then
declining. If we consider for example the Baltic republics, they have invested heavily
but they are still at a low stage of development and the potential returns could be
therefore still high. The next point is how the investments were selected and designed in
order to improve the efficiency of the local private economy. For example, if the
improved roads help the labor market to operate more efficiently, then the returns to
infrastructure is higher than if the investments were used for high-level infrastructure
that has no local impact. Speaking in general terms, it is more advantageous for the less
developed countries to invest into the local infrastructure than get involved in
megalomaniac projects that remain underused. You must always look at the specific
needs of the specific sectors that you want to be developed and the mode of transport
should be tailored to that. Therefore, if we speak about the future of Polish agriculture
and if we expect that, in search of employment, people will move from rural areas to
local little towns, that has definitely significant transport implications that must be
tailored to these needs. On top of it, you must look at the specific skills of the people
and at the specific requirements of industries that are to be developed. There are two
alternatives to the strategy of commuting from rural areas to towns: either to bring the
industries to the villages or to develop the local agriculture only. The latter decision is
very often the least efficient solution.
9 Final Discussion
This final part of the workshop intended to discuss issues that were
insufficiently covered in the previous sessions of the meeting and also provide
opportunity to summarize some general lessons.
Martin Hallet presented a short reminder concerning the main determining
factors of convergence and catching-up.29 There are three groups of factors that should
be considered separately: macroeconomic stability, structural reform of markets, and
                                                
29
 See also Davies, S., Garnier, C., and Hallet, M. (2000) Real convergence and catching-up in
the EU, EUROPEAN ECONOMY, No 71, 2000.
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development of physical and human capital. When analyzing the first group of factors,
one should disagree with the idea that there is a trade-off between stability and growth.
Maybe such a view can hold in the short run when an expansionary policy of the
government leads to some sort of disequilibrium. However, in order to have a sustained
growth and convergence at the same time, we must have macroeconomic stability first.
Nevertheless, the countries in transition are subject to many other specific
circumstances and their macroeconomic stability need not be of a primary concern. For
example, they do not have to comply with the Maastricht criteria immediately from the
early stages. For them there should be left a longer time for adjustment.
As far as the reform of the markets of goods, services, capital and labor is
concerned, this is an issue of paramount importance for the decision making about an
optimal allocation  and/or displacement of resources. The third group of factors
comprises both  private and public investments. The latter includes the development of
infrastructure, education and training, and the EU structural funds are directed to a large
extent to these areas. Each of the three determinants is not sufficient to act on its own,
as well as we cannot expect that the structural funds alone could solve the problems of
cohesion.
Heikki Eskelinen pointed out that the Finnish case has been used a couple of
times in the discussion about how to turn structural policies into a success. The problem
is whether the Finnish model is transferable to countries where the economic
fundamentals are different. Though the direct applicability of the Finish experience is
limited, there are still some specific lessons that can be learnt, similarly like from the
Irish case. One of such lessons concerns the possibility of hi-tech based developments in
a small country. There are obviously serious obstacles to that because the hi-tech is a
very risky business. Before the production starts there must be built a network for the
supplies of special inputs, access to labor force qualified in narrowly defined fields, the
existence of spillovers from other countries, etc.
You may ask how could Finland succeed in circumventing these obstacles? The
Finish   approach was different from the Irish experience in many respects. In Finland,
the main initiatives came from firms that only later received a consistent support from
public policies. It is a paradox that in the Finnish case the legacy of long separation to
peripherality played a role in these decisions. There evolved a mentality to adapt
innovations very quickly and refrain from building institutional obstacles to their
development. That is very different from the environment in many accession countries
where the institutional barriers are very large.
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